Page 277 - Il 1919. Un’Italia vittoriosa e provata in un’Europa in trasformazione. Problematiche e prospettive - Atti 11-12 novembre 2019

IV Sessione - L’Italia a Versailles. Aspetti di politica internazionale 275

cerned with securing the southern border against the Yugoslav state, «since no
use of arms will take place in any case, there is no need to position any artillery». 15
The planned occupation of the German-speaking territories of “German West-
ern Hungary” (Burgenland) can be viewed as the apex of the contrast between
politics and the military. It was intended to be carried out immediately after the
collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, to prevent its troops from entering
German-Austrian territory. On 14 May 1919, the State Military Office received
the corresponding order from State Chancellor Dr. Karl Renner and State Sec-
retary for Foreign Affairs Dr. Otto Bauer. However, deployment of the Volkswehr
as the “official” army of Austria would have represented a formal interference
in the inner affairs of Hungary and was therefore deemed counterproductive to
the negotiations in Paris which had just begun. Boog’s proposal, therefore, man-
ifested itself in the creation of seven “Freikorps” (free regiments) for this task.
Boog insisted that recruiting should exclude Jews, monarchists, Communists, and
members of soldiers’ councils in the Volkswehr, «because we are not supposed to
16
be a political army but an army of the government». Besides the particularly
strong antisemitic tendencies, the exclusion of Volkswehr soldiers’ councils was
completely unacceptable to Deutsch, since these bodies secured his unlimited in-
fluence on and control of the Volkswehr. By the “unofficial” legal status of the
Freikorps, the State Military Office and more importantly the “civilian commis-
sariat” would have been eliminated. Without a doubt the Freikorps would have
given Boog more weight within the military power balance of Austria, especially
since qualified personnel was to be recruited, meaning predominantly former im-
perial soldiers, NCOs, and officers. Deutsch rejected the recruitment of Freikorps,
not least because of the activities of such formations in Germany. On 27 May, a
frustrated Boog resigned from his office of commander-in-chief and the position
17
was not filled with a replacement. The primacy defined by Deutsch, armed
forces with an internal political function, had triumphed over military necessities
and foreign policy goals. Deutsch’s classification of Boog as “reactionary” cer-
tainly is not correct, quite on the contrary. Boog had – whether due to career rea-
sons or pragmatism – already in early 1919 critically mentioned the “old” army

15 Kristan, Geschichte Generalstab, p. 31
16 ÖSTA/KA/Manuskripte/AEI 2/5 Orientierung über Maßnahmen zur Besetzung Deutschen
Gebietes in Westungarn, Anlage II
17 Glaubauf, Die Volkswehr 1918 – 1920, p. 83