Page 135 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

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tions, these would have had little if any consequences for distant regions within the empire.
Even wars against the Persians, the only foreign enemy that might be called “major”, did
normally cause little repercussions throughout the rest of the empire; while the catastrophic
defeat Crassus suffered at the hand of the Persians in 53 BC may have been an unpleasant
surprise for the urban elite in Rome, it did have little practical consequences for someone
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living for example in the province of Sicily. The plague that forced Marcus Aurelius to aban-
don his operations in the east in ... is one of the very few examples where the outcome of
military operations actually managed to affect a large part of the empire - sending his soldiers
back into their quarters most probably helped spread the disease throughout the empire.
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However, even in this case were the negative effects felt throughout the empire not so much
caused by the military action itself, but rather by the end of it.
By the end of the first century AD, war itself was not only no longer an experience that all
citizens shared, it was something rarely if ever experienced by many who lived in areas that
after the Augustan army reforms were, like Gaul, devoid of any military presence. It was only
in the context of civil wars that the Romans actually experienced massive disturbances as a
consequence of military action, and even then not all regions of the empire were affected.
By removing the army to the borders, vastly reducing its numbers and considerably in-
creasing the number of years one had to serve many inhabitants of provinces within the em-
pire now had a very good chance never to see a soldier in their lifetime, apart perhaps from
an old veteran settling in their area; actually, it was exactly this marginalization of military
affairs within Roman society that was at the very core of the Augustan reforms.
The famous pax Augusta was hailed throughout the empire as an end to war and as the be-
ginning of a new and peaceful era. It did not mean the end of warfare, though, as the Roman
expeditions to Germany show that would eventually only come to an end under Tiberius.
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instead, pax Augusta designated a period of internal peace and stability after a century of
civil wars and the end of the use of military force within the empire. In order to achieve this,
Augustus had to a great degree effectively demilitarized the society, thereby fundamentally
changing the relationship between non-combatant citizens and the military. And although the
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military reforms at the end of the crisis of empire right at the end of the 3 century again put
greater emphasis on conscription, society as a whole remained one of civilians that now
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was increasingly at odds with the military. 29

25 It is debatable whether the battle of Carrhae was in any way seen as a turning point by the Romans. E. Whee-
ler has pointed out that the battle only gains prominence in Rome after 20 BC, when Augustus brought the
legionary eagles lost at Carrhae back through negotiations; see E. Wheeler, The Army and the Limes in the
East, in: P. Erdkamp (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Army, Oxford 2007, 235-266, 261.
26 Ha Verus 8.1-2; HA Marc. 13.3-5, 17.2, 21.6; Amm. Marc. 6.24.
27 In the overall context of the war in Germany, the famous battle of the Teutoburg forest was just one - admitte-
dly major - Roman setback. The war was resumed again in AD 10 and continued until AD 16, when Tiberius
finally ended offensive operations in Germany; see D. Timpe, Der Triumph des Germanicus, Bonn 1968.
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28 On the reforms of the 3 century see Y. Bohec/C. Wolff (edd.), L’armée romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien
Ier, Paris 2004.
29 Laws like Cod. Theod. 7.9.3 prohibiting soldiers to food and clothing from civilians they were billetted with
point at a considerable amount of friction between the army and the civilian population.