Page 150 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

150 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

makes no demands on transport, requires no muscular effort and is all-consuming.’ 9
Edward III’s chevauchée through the Cambresis in 1339 was so devastating as to be wor-
thy of a papal enquiry and aid mission to the region. It has been estimated by Clifford Rogers
that armies were capable of a band of devastation some 40 km wide along their line of march.
Using this calculation he suggests that the Black Prince’s 1355 chevauchee from Bordeaux
almost to the Mediterranean may have been responsible for the destruction of 18,000 square
kilometres of territory in addition to the specific pillaging and burning of a dozen or so en-
emy towns. When devastation was a normal tool of commanders it was easy to see how the
civilian population was likely to suffer. 10
Clearly, the exactions of several thousand soldiers, the equivalent of a population of a
contemporary city, were bound to put a huge drain on the lands through which they passed,
before they tended to any deliberate destruction. But stationery garrisons also placed a huge
demand upon their surrounding territories. The cost of maintaining troops of cavalry and
their specialist auxiliaries such as crossbowmen was high both in terms of pay and suste-
nance. Contested frontiers placed an additional pressure upon the inhabitants of the disputed
territory, as they often had to pay tribute to both sides. Given the often insecure nature of
royal finances in both England and France (Edward III actually went bankrupt in 1341 and
defaulted on his debts to the Italian banks, bringing a number of them down), such exac-
tions were legitimised under the title of the appatis. The studies of Maurice Keen and, more
recently, Nigel Wright explore the implications of this burdensome system for local commu-
nities. Wright uses the term ‘borrowed lordship’ to explain how local rulers of expedience,
soldiers or mercenaries placed in a position of authority by the exigencies of warfare, could
effectively milk a territory dry by their exactions. In the case of mercenaries, of course, if
they were paid - and this was not certain – it was only in wartime. During times of truce (all
that was recognized throughout the era, peace being often a step too far), mercenaries had to
fend for themselves. So it was that bands of them, known as the Free Companies, terrorised
large areas of France from the 1350s onwards, causing more damage than even the formal
and legitimate military operations sanctioned by the princes.
Just as an aside, although mercenaries have a terrible reputation today and indeed are
condemned by the Geneva Conventions, this should not leave us with anachronistic belief
that all mercenary troops, at all times, are always a scourge. Under the ancien régime, mer-
cenaries often formed the reliable core of royal forces and indeed when the French kings and
th
Burgundian dukes formed their Compagnies d’Ordnance in the mid-15 century these were
the origin of regular armies in Western Europe. The problem then was not mercenaries per
se, but unpaid mercenaries. Many of them rightly acquired the title of échorcheurs (flayers)
in the ways that conducted themselves whilst seeking sustenance or grabbing power. Their
‘borrowed lordship’ was all the more exploitative because of its uncertain basis.
So, is it then impossible to find any proper regulation of warfare in the pre-modern (pre-
1500) period? I would answer ‘No’. While it is true that long-running wars destroyed social
cohesion and allowed soldiers to bully local populations, in times of relative peace, the royal

9 Hewett, p. 46.
10 Wright citing Rogers ‘By Fire and Sword’ p. 69 fn. 34. This actual number may be too large but it powerfully
evokes the potential impact of chevauchee.