Page 228 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

228 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

reported that 12 soldiers (both British and Hessian) deserted to the enemy. And in fact, it was
a British army deserter named Coffin who tipped off American militia forces across Narra-
gansett Bay that the British Commandant, Major General Richard Prescott, habitually spent
his evenings in an isolated farmstead owned by a Mr. Overing and located 4 miles from the
town. It was also noted that Prescott was usually accompanied by a minimal personal guard
and local militia commander, lieutenant Colonel William Barton, conceived a daring plan to
seize the General in a night raid on the Overing farmhouse.
To add a further incentive, the Rhode Island General Assembly offered bounties of $20
dollars for each private soldier captured and upwards of $1000 dollars for a general. It would
seem that Barton had decided to garner the top prize. But actually capturing Prescott proved
to be more difficult than it seemed. First and foremost, Barton and his raid force of 38 men
had to row, with muffled oars 15 miles and pass undetected between at least 2 British frigates,
HMS Chatham and HMS Diamond immediately offshore. Then, in total darkness thread their
way for one-half mile to the Overing house on the island’s West Road. Fortunately, Barton
and his party got to the farmhouse undetected and quickly overcame the sentry posted out-
side the General’s bedroom door. Simultaneously seizing the General’s secretary, Lieutenant
Barrington, successfully kidnapped them and had rowed across the bay and back between the
frigates before anyone knew that Prescott and his lieutenant were missing. Prescott proved
to be such a valuable prize that he was quickly exchanged for Continental Army Major
General Charles Lee, who had been captured in New Jersey in December 1776. even the
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British had to admire Barton’s audacity. Frederick Mackenzie wrote on 11 July 1777 that the
“rebels” had executed their raid “in a masterly manner, and deserve credit for the attempt. It
is certainly a most extraordinary circumstance, that a General Commanding a body of 4000
men, encamped on an Island surrounded by a Squadron of Ships of War, should be carried
off from his quarters in the night by a small party of the Enemy from without, & without a
Shot being fired.” Mackenzie further believed that the raid was “convincing proof that the
Enemy receive from some of the Inhabitants of this Island, the most perfect intelligence of
every circumstance of which they wish to be informed.” 23
During the months of June and July 1777, Mackenzie also observed an upsurge in raid-
ing activity against exposed British and Hessian detachments on the north end of the island.
He took time to note during this same period three suicides by British and Hessian soldiers
and the desertion of a number of soldiers of previous “good character.” Mackenzie was con-
vinced that the reason for these events was directly due to “our having remained so long in a
State of inactivity. The Soldiers have nothing to do but to mount Guard once in three or four
days….While all the rest of the Army is in Motion [meaning those assigned elsewhere in the
American theater] naturally leads some to gloomy reflections, and induces others to commit
actions disgraceful to themselves, hurtful to the discipline of the Army, and destructive to the
Cause of their Country.” Mackenzie believed that his men should conduct raiding operations
themselves to “employ the minds of the Soldiery, give them something to do and talk of…
and give them confidence.” 24

22 Gerald M. Carbone, “Barton’s Daring Plan Nets a British General,” Providence Journal 13 June 2006.
23 Mackenzie, Vol. 1, 150.
24 Mackenzie, Vol. 1., 146-147.