Page 304 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I
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304 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm
ing front troops. The army high command, which was fully aware of the danger of the strike
movement, placed about 39 battalions, which were employed in the conurbations of Vienna
and Budapest, at the disposal of the hinterland. Thus the strength of the assistance troops had
almost doubled. The appearance of front troops, with all their equipment, machine guns and
hand grenades, was of special importance because of the psychological effect. In some places
only their appearance led to the quick containment of the unrest. Nevertheless, the hinterland
demanded even more front troops. The army high command could understandably not meet
the requests but promise that, if necessary, troops being transported via the hinterland would
be employed as assistance forces.
The end of the “January strikes” was finally brought about because of the interference of
the Social Democrat Workers Party, even if only the appearance of the assistances worked
in certain places as well. thus the question now arose how due to these finding the question
of military - assistances could further be handled or how an efficient organization could be
found in the future. As the troops employed for assistance purposes were not to affect the
reinforcement of the front troops, another solution had to be found. In agreement with the
Ministry of War the army high command decided to withdraw especially battle-weary divi-
sions from the front and refresh them in the hinterland. At the same time these troops were
to undergo an intensive education and if necessary - were to serve as assistance units. Due to
this measure a total of four field division use came to the Austrian part of the monarchy, three
to Hungary or Croatia-Slavonia.
While the first big employment of assistance troops in January was aimed at suppressing
strike movements, the task spectre changed from mid-1918 onwards. Not only social prob-
lems led to uprisings and revolts, but also nationalist tensions had their share in it. Moreover,
due to the precarious food situation military assistances were also called for to help with grain
requisitions in agriculture. This had especially negative effects on the internal bond of the as-
sistance troops, as they were now directly confronted with the misery of the population.
The Austro-Hungarian POWs coming home from Russian war imprisonment proved to
be an additional destabilizing factor. In Russia many of them had come in touch with the
social upheavals of the Russian Revolution and transferred their thoughts into the Austro-
Hungarian armed forces. Due to the permanent shortage of staff at the front most of the
repatriated soldiers had to join the ranks of the reinforcement troops and to return to the front
after a short vacation only. It was the prospect of having to go back to the front again after
having suffered innumerable privations during war imprisonment as well as the precarious
food situation that considerably worsened the mood of the repatriated soldiers. Together with
nationalist tensions the feeling of dissatisfaction began to spread to the rest of the reinforce-
ment troops. The consequences were numerous uprisings and mutinies, which affected those
units actually designated to suppress such movements by means of a assistance operations.
The military authorities reacted by mean of a renewed change of garrisons, as the repat-
riated ranks much too often took up the mood of the people living there-be it in a social or
nationalist respect - and became unreliable. Moreover, drastic measures were taken which
classified all revolts as mutiny or “uprising” and punished them according to martial law.
Thus, the reliability of the “assistance troops” as shown during the strike. in January was
heavily impaired and prevented their employment during the overthrow situation in October/
November 1918.