Page 464 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I
P. 464

464                                XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

              One can only marvel at the depth of the xenophobia and racism in those words. No won-
           der so many Soviet civilians, especially those old enough to remember the last great conflict,
           experienced such shock at German behavior. They remembered that German troops had, on
           the whole, acted in a civilized manner the last time they were in Russia. Now the Russians
           confronted a truly genocidal force, a force that was apparently so convinced of its own supe-
           riority that it was willing to kill millions of other people in its quest for domination.
              And what of the order itself? Reichenau sent a copy to Gerd von Rundstedt, commander
           of Army Group South, who liked it so much that he had copies sent to his other army com-
           manders and the commander of his rear area. Hitler also got a copy, and insisted that it go to
           every unit on the eastern front.
              We cannot easily gauge the effect the order had on ordinary German troops; in an army
           of millions, there is room, of course, for nearly every opinion imaginable. From the letters
           that many German troops wrote, we know that a significant proportion of them shared Re-
           ichenau’s opinions. They had, after all, heard them many times before. At the same time,
           however, senior commanders rarely feel obligated to explain policy matters to their troops.
           This order’s existence is thus an indication, and indeed it states explicitly, that not all troops
           were toeing the Nazi line. Many of them acted decently within the narrow scope afforded
           them, even while many of them believed in the fundamental rightness of their cause.
              The Soviets, naturally, had a different perspective. By the time this order came out, they
           had already formed an understanding of what German victory would mean. Here the Ger-
           mans’ statements and actions backfired strategically. They succeeded in the difficult task of
           convincing many Soviet citizens that Nazism was worse than Stalinism. Their reward would
           be unrelenting resistance and brutality at the front and behind it, culminating in defeat and
           destruction for the Reich they thought they were protecting.
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