Page 475 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

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aCta
attractive. These torpedoes were being retired as quickly as possible because their warheads
were deemed inadequate for use aboard contemporary destroyers. The success of a simple,
side-dropping gear like that used on late-model, Second World-War PT boats meant that no
expensive launch gear would be required, and crews could be recruited from among the mo-
torboat enthusiasts of the voluntary naval reserve.
Offensive use of such small vessels nonetheless presented problems. MAS were, of
course, vulnerable to air attack, operating, as they did, close to shore in a narrow sea. One to
four 6.5-mm Colt “potato-digger” machineguns provided some nominal anti-aircraft defense,
but the boats were largely defenseless in daylight. They had to work closely with friendly
aircraft. Given clear visibility, they could also be hit by the gunfire of shore fortifications, the
secondary batteries of capital ships, and pursuing destroyers. A hit from even a small shell
would generally destroy the boat. So MAS had to have the support of friendly destroyers that
could screen their retreat. To get themselves to the Italian destroyers’ patrol line, the MAS
crews pioneered the near-universal MTB tactic of using shallow-fused depth charges and
smoke floats to discourage pursuit. These tactics were so successful that only one MAS was
lost to enemy action during the war. Accidental gasoline fires and collisions proved to be the
principle threat to the boats.
Given their limitations, the siluranti had to carry out most of their missions at night,
much like their WW-2 descendents. They would lie in wait off anchorages or among the
rocky islands and net defenses that kept Allied destroyers and submarines away from Aus-
tria’s Dalmation convoys. Using their anti-submarine hydrophones to listen for propellers
and their silent-running, 5-hp, Rognini electric motors for station-keeping, they would wait
until a convoy or patrol vessel attempted to enter the harbor. Then, still on electrics only, they
would tuck in behind, slip through the boom defenses, launch their twin 45-cm torpedoes,
and retire at high speed in the resulting confusion. These operations were so successful that
the Austrians mounted an unsuccessful commando raid on Ancona with the express purpose
of seizing MAS for their own navy.
Smoke and depth charges was a useful defensive expedient, but they did nothing to an-
swer the other shortcoming of an all-torpedo armament: the expense and uncertainty of at-
tacking the shallow-draft coastal shipping and sailing vessels Austria relied on for much
of its transport with expensive and temperamental high-technology weapons. Italian boats
were, moreover, increasingly subject to attack by Austrian small craft. While Austria never
managed to produce its own equivalent to the MAS, it nonetheless possessed a small force
of armed launches, motor gunboats, picket boats, and impressed motor yachts that could,
at times, engage MAS. Gun-armed MAS would thus be invaluable in inshore waters where
friendly destroyers could not safely follow. Many were accordingly outfitted as cannoniere
with a quick firing, 47-mm cannon mounted on top of the forward hatch. Maids of all work,
cannoniere screened siluranti, destroyers, and torpedo boats (small destroyers), escorted in-
shore convoys, recovered downed airmen, landed spies and saboteurs, covered the flanks of
coastal advances, and functioned as miniature navies on the large, glacial lakes that grace the
foothills the Austro-Italian border region.
8
Attack on Trieste. But it is the MAS, with Cattaneo innovative power-pack, that are most

8 Robert Craig Johnson, Ibid.