Page 499 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

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aCta
Romanian Minister of Defense rejected the soviet proposals of military intervention in Po-
25
land in order to support the communist government besieged by the opposition . On June 28,
1983, on the occasion of the reunion in Moscow of the Political Consultative Committee, the
Romanian delegation rejected the soviet proposals of placing medium range missiles in the
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Needless to say, the proposal
of installing the soviet missiles was quickly adopted by the other delegations and put into
26
practice .
A decisive change took place once with the new policy of Mikhail Gorbachev. When, dur-
ing the reunion of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact (May 1987, in
Berlin), the adoption of the military doctrine of the alliance was put into discussion, Nicolae
Ceaučescu proposed several amendments, hoping that they will not be accepted and stating at
the same time that his country has its own defense doctrine, in accordance and in cooperation
with the others states within the Pact. Gorbachev, however, adopted the proposed amend-
ments, so that the Romanian leader had to sign them .
27
In spite of the new doctrine and of the entire previous conduct, the events of 1988-1989
and the gradual collapse of communism in Eastern Europe made Ceaučescu to support the
urgent reunion of a conference of the communist countries, of the Warsaw Pact and the mili-
tary intervention in Poland and Hungary in order to “put and end to the foreign imperialist in-
tervention”. What this last attempt really meant is not yet very clear, but the anti-Gorbachev
stance was obvious.

V. Therefore, after this historical reconstruction, let us try finding an answer for the fol-
lowing question: was the “people’s war” promoted by Bucharest after the events of August
1968 an ideological mobilization or a real vector of action?
The provisions of the “Defense Law” of 1972 have gradually found their way into prac-
tice, but with difficulties, postponements and confusions. The growing importance of the
army in the national economy in the 70s and especially in the 80s strongly affected its pro-
fessionalism and led to convulsions at the command levels. Also, the professionalism of the
army was harmed by the growing importance of the patriotic guards in the field of defense,
something that led to a hostile “dichotomy” between the two vectors of a potential defense
effort. The freshening of the army personnel with the “working class element” – promoting
the workers taken from the field of production in the active duty to the rank of officers –,
which was massive in the 80s, also contributed to a drastic decrease in the professionalism
of the Romanian army.
In this context, the “Polish crisis” in the 80s, when the army took control by “martial
law”, should be paid more attention. For the communist leadership in Bucharest, it was a
proper example that the army can play a role in the leadership of the country, and this percep-
tion determined the strengthening of the communist control in the ranks of the military.
Gradually, the initial intention of promoting through “people’s war” a doctrine of real
resistance in face of a potential soviet invasion gave way to a pragmatic approach. Keep-

25 Constantin olteanu, Coaliόia politico-militarό, Bucurečti, 1996, p. 228.
26 Gl. corp de armatč (r) Ion Gheorghe, Gl. brigadč (r) Corneliu Soare, op.cit., p. 204.
27 Ibidem, p.p. 212-213.