Page 206 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

708 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

of them had similar experiences in counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam and Algeria.
David Galula was one of these French officers. His book, Counterinsurgency Warfare:
Theory and Practice, was published in 1964. Galula and his writings were starting to have
some influence on the American Army as it was increasing its involvement in Vietnam.
29
Almost forty years later as the American Army became involved in a major counterinsur-
gency war in Iraq Galula’s book and his other writings heavily influenced the writing of the
American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006.
Based on his experience fighting the insurgency in Algeria from 1956 to 1958 Galula de-
scribed an operational method that had a counterinsurgent military force clearing an area of
insurgents, then holding it with local military and police forces, then building on these gains
by improving local infrastructure and political systems. What became known as the “clear,
hold, build” method in counterinsurgency was not unique to Galula’s writings. But Galula
30
did formalize this overall process into an operational method for a counterinsurgent army to
apply in revolutionary war.
One of the specific techniques recommended by Galula in his writings to ensure that
a counterinsurgent force became ensconced within the population was the establishing of
small combat outposts manned by counterinsurgent soldiers and scattered throughout local
villages. As a infantry company commander fighting Alerian insurgents, Galula’s area of
responsibility was very small—about 4 kilometers wide by about 4 kilometers deep--and
was located deep inside the north algerian mountains. the local population totaled about
13,000, and they were isolated from the few major urban areas in Algeria. With his infantry
company of about 150 men, Galula could easily isolate and control the few villages in his
area by placing infantry platoons in these outposts. Still, in this relatively straightforward
counterinsurgency environment, it took Galula and his infantry company close to a year and
a half to pacify the area by using the techniques he developed to separate the insurgents from
the people. 31
A contemporary French Army officer of Galula’s, Roger Trinquier, wrote a book on his
experiences in fighting revolutionary wars during the 1950s. Trinquier’s writings accepted
the same premises as other French officers. Namely that revolutionary war was something
radically different from past wars and that to fight them successfully in the future armies had
to be transformed. He also accepted the fundamental premise of the people being the key to

29 For example, the RAND Corporation held a conference for the US Army on counterinsurgency operations
as it was increasing its commitment in Vietnam in 1962 (“Counterinsurgency: A Symposium,” April 16-20,
1962). Interestingly, conference participants were, among others, David Galula and British Army officer,
Frank Kitson. Kitson’s post Vietnam writings on counterinsurgency operations would become influential
with the American Army and the writing of FM 3-24; on Kitson see especially his Warfare as a Whole (lon-
don: Faber and Faber 1987).
30 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 107-135; for a useful summary of a series of analyses of the years by the
Rand Corporation on lessons learned and counterinsurgencies (of which many lessons were habitually drawn
from the writings of theorists like Galula and Trinquier) see Austin Long, On ‘Other War:’ Lessons from Five
Decades of RAND and Counterinsurgency Research, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006); and Austin
long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrance: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960–1970 and
2003–2006, , (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006).
31 On Galula’s specific experiences as an infantry company commander in North Algeria see his Pacification
in Algeria, 1956-58, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 1964).