Page 288 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

790 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Domingo, more resources and funds meant that more emphasis was placed on public instruc-
tion in the early years, but military units (in the absence of municipal police) also had to carry
th
out basic functions of city life— in Santiago 4 Regiment Marines aided in controlling a fire
in the city’s business district; rural towns, especially those in the west and the north that
57
were most isolated from the transportation networks to the capital city, emphasized public
health and sanitation, institutions for which in those areas were previously almost nonex-
istent; many of the western areas under command of Marines developed much differently
because their administrators were concerned, too, with the policing of the newly redefined
Haitian border, on the other side of which Marines were fighting against Haitian insurgents
in the Cacos Wars. As Fuller points out, “The Marine brigade in the Dominican Republic
had no organized, nationwide program for improving the economic and social condition of
the people, but some Marine officers as part of their work as district commanders, provost
marshals, and commanders of GND or PND units made efforts in that direction.” Celebrated
occupation leader Lieutenant George C. Thorpe, for example, in his stint as a commander of
a battalion in the war-filled Seibo Province in the east in 1918, “called meetings of provincial
and municipal officials in his district to promote agricultural development and improve fa-
cilities for marketing local crops. He also organized Red Cross drives and rallies in the vari-
ous towns on the theory that support for charity and war relief would bring Americans and
Dominicans closer together.” Marine Sergeant William Knox, also a regional captain in the
58
east, developed programs to improve agriculture and develop roads for similar reasons. His
efforts to improve solidarity were so successful that a number of prominent Dominicans—
though certainly not the entire community—openly mourned his death when he was killed by
guerrillas. Fuller’s report, though, should be problematized; he details much lower incidents
59
of reports of “friction” between Marines and Dominicans than even Marine records there
demonstrate, and does not emphasize increasing hostility in later years despite the records in
the archives that demonstrate clearly and unquestionably that hostility was increasing in all
regions of the country as Dominicans became more united under military government-built
infrastructure. 60
Other attempts at improving both social order in the country and civil-military relations
were more culturally based. Marines initiated a number of programs to replace the traditional
sport of cockfighting with that of baseball—introducing it for the first time, in some areas—
and then to build more nationally based teams and competitions, through which Dominicans
and Marines could engage in friendly competition through the sport of baseball. Dominican
acceptance of the sport varied by region, but was overall very widespread, and regional to na-
tional competitions sponsored by the military government went a long way toward improv-
ing Marine relations with both the Dominican GND members and those in their communities
who learned baseball from them. Yet when teams and training were organized and the sport
began to spread, financial cuts meant that the military government and the Marine Corps

57 U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Division. A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 122.
58 Fuller, 59.
59 Ibid.
60 Fuller, 88. “Gobierno Militar” and “Ejército Nacional” record groups, AGN.