Page 312 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

814 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

tive use in the 1960s. Modern weapons like the Kalashnikov submachine guns (item 8) were
delivered only in small quantities. It should be noted that the anti-personnel mines (item 13),
which had been massively used by all warring parties in Southern Africa, to this day have
continued to claim the lives of the rural population.
From 1967 on there are many documents to confirm that armament shipments occurred
almost annually.
When Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the anti-colonial libera-
tion fight turned into an intra-Mozambican civil war, albeit with strong support from abroad.
The term “intra-Mozambican” is therefore not completely correct.
The NVA continued to provide military aid to FRELIMO, however, the fronts had re-
versed: government forces had to be supported against a guerilla. The FRELIMO had to repel
attacks of insurgents. Mao’s tactics of guerilla being like “a fish in the Sea“ was now used
by RENAMO.
Maputo’s army was forced onto the defensive and was several times on the brink of mili-
tary defeat by RENAMO in the early 1980s.
Corresponding candid reports and analyses by the GDR military attaché can be found in
NVA and SED archives. The files include numerous documents in which the Angolan and
Mozambican governments were requesting, even begging for military advisors and trainers
from the East German Army. East Berlin always refused. Instead they offered training in the
GDR.
East Berlin seemed to have found an ideal way of providing military support. Instead of
sending their own servicemen or instructors into dangerous and incalculable civil wars, they
invited African military personnel to the GDR.
This was not dangerous militarily and much less explosive in political terms. Plus, it was
more efficient and economical: Instead of setting up costly capacities in insecure civil war
countries and, probably, pouring money into bottomless pits, the GDR used military struc-
tures at home.
The Mozambican soldiers were given standard NVA-style training at schools of the
GDR’s National People’s Army: Mozambicans were trained as officers or unit commanders
in the following branches: tanks, artillery, motorized rifle troops, rear services, automotive
engineering and communication engineering at the officer school on the island of Rügen
which had been established exclusively for training foreign military personnel. Political of-
ficers were trained there as well.
the training comprised both a theoretical part and a practical part on equipment and in
the field.
This photo shows Mozambican officer students in East German uniforms during artillery
training on the island of Rügen. Guerilla warfare was not taught.
In addition to the military training the students attended lessons in mathematics, sci-
ence, German and sports. Political education and excursions to towns and factories of the
GDR were also part of the training. The main objective of the training was to ideologically
influence the Africans. They were to be educated as socialists. The training was, therefore,
planned not only with a view to short-term military objectives but to long-term psychological
effect: Officers trained in the GDR were to perpetuate the alleged “socialism” in Africa.