Page 231 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

FROM THE STRAITS TO THE VOLTURNO 229

Also the Count of Cavour and the politics of Piedmont embittered
Garibaldi’s life.
After the occupation of Naples, the great minister organised his carefully con-
th
sidered military intervention (on September 11 , 1860, after an exchange of
lively messages between Turin and Rome, the Army led by General Fanti - 4 th
and 5 th Corps and 13 th Division – had crossed the border and starter to march
across the Papal State) not only to consolidate the achievements of the volun-
teers but also to avoid that the revolution itself could undermine the advantage
achieved, by spreading and reaching Rome and by producing other untimely
actions, since Garibaldi, in his heroic enthusiasm and generous impulsiveness of
his great soul still focused his attention on the eternal city, although he had other
thoughts connected to his Dictatorship, and often said to his men that if the
Piedmont Government had delayed the removal of the temporal power of the
Pontiff “no one could have stopped him from resolving this issue with his
sabre in his hand”.
Moreover – and we have already pointed this out– the absence of the Savoy
monarchy in so many events would seriously damaged its prestige. And if no one
could honestly doubt Garibaldi’s loyalty, it was however necessary to merge as
soon as possible the regular and the voluntary forces, so that the commander’s
loyalty could not under any circumstances be challenged and overwhelmed by
more inflamed followers.
Being impartial as well as sharp-witted, Guerzoni observed that the expedi-
tion in the Marche and Umbria regions “, after the Crimea war could be seen,
the more inspired and more fated action of the great statesman. With that action
he saved at the same time the monarchy and Italy; he stopped the impetuous
course of the revolution and then redirected it to achieve its goal in a more cer-
tain way”.
With all that, Cavour’s action, and especially his ill concealed intention to
make sure that the monarchy should not owe too much to the volunteers, the
unjustified mistrust of some politicians and his regret at not being able to con-
tinue in his action of liberation distressed the General and depressed his noble
mind.
However, facing the urgent needs and the ever-new political and military
complications appearing at the horizon, Garibaldi did not remain inactive.
While, as we saw, he harshly repressed the rebellions, he organised the last
clash with the Bourbon troops that all the signs indicated was imminent.
Orders were given to general Türr, so that the volunteers could be organised