Page 284 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

266 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

that he could operate in Valcamonica with Brescia as the objective, and, at the
same time, approach from behind Garibaldi, eventually reaching the flank of
the Italian Army. But Gucciardi, having learned of this advance through the
two valleys, decided to launch a counter-offensive hinging upon the Mortirolo;
he therefore ordered that, on the night of the 3 rd July, two companies of the
XLIV battalion of the National guard and two of the Bersaglieri Castellini
would advance on the Mortirolo: a concept that reveals an uncommon spirit of
initiative but one that Caldesi, who was stationary in Incudine, only started.

On the 4 th July the battle of Vezza took place, an event that constituted
the most important episode of the operations in Valcamonica.
The evening of the 2 nd , under heavy rain the Bersaglieri of the II battal-
ion arrived to Edolo from Breno on rustic carts: from here they transferred to
the camp of Incudine and after a short stay moved a little further, to the small
group of houses of Davena. The high ground on the left (right of the Oglio)
had not been occupied, nor had there been a reconnaissance of the woodland
on the other bank; the I st battalion of the 4 th regiment (Major Caldesi),
with two pieces, was on the Davenino stream where it seemed to have decid-
ed to stand firm. However, the same evening he had sent his 2 nd company
(Lieutenant Malacrida) to occupy the built-out area of Vezzo, with the task,
of getting a footing on the next high ground; while further behind the
Castellini Battalion remained as in outposts. That company, posted a little
th
east of Vezza, at the cemetery, on the early hours of the 4 , had a skirmish
with an Austrian company that travelling on the right side of the Oglio, had
arrived silently and by surprise, to the square of the village, entering from the
opposite side than the one guarded by the volunteers. Meanwhile part of the
Albertini Austrian column was advancing to the middle of the coast of the
right bank of the Oglio, on positions closely dominating the built-up area of
Vezza, and large patrols were hiding in the protected ground on the left: the
bulk of it was following half hour away. Caldesi, maybe convinced of the idea
to keep the defence as back as possible, sent – at this point inopportunely -
the order to move out of Vezza; but the order was not communicated to
Castellini, who because of an earlier talk with Caldesi, could believe in very
different aims and therefore sent forward again the company of the red shirts,
and even adding one of his own (Adamoli). But it was by now too late to take
back the position of Vezza, already in Austrian hands. Wisely the Bersaglieri
tried to go up to the high grounds; here too they had been preceded by the