Page 335 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 317

fighting; they often became dangerous hordes even for public order in the
regions where they were recruited and organized.
The embarrassment of the ministry for the use of these improvised units
grew more and more, and on 22 January 1871 Freycinet telegraphed
Gambetta that the issue of the mobilisés had become serious. Freycinet com-
plained that the prefects «with no exception, had organised badly equipped
Battalions, with no weapons, led by bad officers and with absolutely no mil-
itary training» and he added that «the decision to take them to the front to
satisfy the impatience of prefects had been quite dangerous, since they were
but an hindrance for their lack of values and even worse».
Together with the mobilisés there were units of snipers formed by brave
men who, animated by fervent patriotism, had rushed under the flags to fight
the invader. The Italian volunteers competed with them in bravery and fight-
ing spirit.
In the French campaign the Italian volunteers were not numerous: two
legions were formed under the lead of Tanara, that wonderful Garibaldian
soldier who had participated in all previous campaigns, and Ravelli, divided
into Battalions.
Their limited number depended, first of all, on the concern that in Italy
was felt about the outcome of that unequal fight that was believed to end in
a catastrophe. On the other hand, the former Garibaldian soldiers felt a
strong dislike of fighting side by side with de Failly’s soldiers; moreover, since
they had to go to France at their own expenses, very few, the well-off, could
have afforded such an expensive journey and, finally, the rigorous orders
issued by the Italian government for which the police arrested whoever was
suspected of wanting to go to France, made very difficult their recruitment.
Even among the most loyal comrades of the past Garibaldian feats there was
a certain perplexity: many hesitated between their distress of not being at the
side of their loved commander and, if they had followed him, their unswerv-
ing although explainable dislike of fighting at the side of the French who with
the wonders of their chassepots had shed Italian blood in Mentana. This led
to a natural and automatic selection; and the elements of the Italian legion
could be considered as crack troops. As a consequence, they formed the great-
est and most efficient core of the French Army of the Vosges, who, together
with the Corps of snipers, formed the unfortunately meagre part of real com-
batants that Garibaldi could use against the Prussians.