Page 58 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

56 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

so in May, when the annexation of Lombardy, Venice, and the Duchies to the
Kingdom of Sardinia had been proclaimed. Mazzini and the leaders of the rev-
olutionary movement had protested and said that the conspiracies, the risks,
the victories of the Milanese did not have to end with the annexation of
Lombardy to Piedmont depriving it of the freedoms it had conquered through
the revolution; the supporters of the monarchy had replied that Piedmont had
risked the lives of its men and had provided weapons, reputations, monies and
had not done so to establish a republic. These were thoughts and discussions
too conflicting with one another to reach a compromise. The provisional gov-
ernment of Lombardy had failed to find one. This government suffered from
internal divisions and was afraid of going against the people’s desires if public
opinion prevailed; it therefore set some limitations on the press and tried to
control public opinion. This government had been so ambiguous in his behav-
iour that Carlo Alberto and the Piedmont government doubted that Milan
had undergone the annexation driven by a need of the moment, but wanted
something different. In the Subalpine Parliament the fear was expressed that
the future constituent Assembly, appointed to discuss and establish the forms
of the new State and transform the Albertine Statute into a pact approved by
the people’s representatives, could go beyond that and overthrow the old order
of the Sardinian State to achieve the Republic.
This fearful ghost of the Republic had since its origin, dispirited and
sapped the energy and resolution of the King, his followers and the Subalpine
ministry, and had prevented the establishment of the mutual and cordial trust,
the harmony of efforts that were crucial at that time to defeat the enemy.
Moreover, the Lombards had arrived at the dangerous conviction that the
Sardinian Army would be sufficient to defeat the Germans that the Lombards
had already put to flight and that the Sardinian Army did not need any help,
and therefore it was reprimanded for its alleged inactivity and urged to action.
th
However, after its lucky victories at Goito and Peschiera on May 30 , the
Sardinian Army had been deployed, based on the decision of insufficient and
dubious commanders, on a vast front going from Rivoli to the Po River, to
hold the Mincio line and to protect Lombardy. The Army was exhausted by
such a long period in tents, weakened by illness and hunger, and was in dif-
ficult and perhaps already desperate condition not only because of the very
poor assistance received by the Lombards, but also because of the defections
of the other Italian troops, who, not up to the needs and expectations, had
already withdrawn in part and in part had already been defeated by the