Page 95 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version
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THE 1849 CAMPAIGN                         93



               maximum defence, and deployed just two companies on the Parioli hills, to
               guarantee a defence against a possible surprise attack from the Milvian
               Bridge. But the Roman command failed to give the right importance to Villa
               Corsini and Villa Pamphili, that, due to their dominant position, represent-
               ed the natural outpost for the stretch of walls targeted by the French; during
               the armistice, no works of fortification had been carried out there, and, more-
               over, at the eve of the new attack, a largely insufficient defence had been
               assigned there: just three or four hundred among students and volunteers,
               with more of an observation task than a defensive one.
                  A great threat was advancing on the Republic of the Triumvirs.
                  While the French denounced the truce, the Austrians were already march-
               ing, through the Marche and Umbria regions, and in Gaeta a Spanish expe-
                                                                    th
               ditionary corps had disembarked as early as May 27 , led by General
               Fernandez de Cordoba; luckily enough, this new enemy contingent, after
               receiving the blessing of Pius IX on the isthmus of Montesecco, moved from
                                   rd
               Fondi only on June 3 , and then stopped for a long time in Terracina, and
               from there, making more noise than damage, headed unattached to Terni and
               Spoleto.
                  By far more worrying and serious was the French and Austrian threat, and
               Garibaldi well realised it, so that immediately after coming back to Rome he
               wrote to Mazzini and asked to be entrusted the fight against the Austrians,
               under the direct lead of the Triumvirate. And such a decision would have per-
               haps been taken if an ultimatum by Oudinot had not come. Called to express
               his opinion on what to do, Garibaldi spoke with clear words: “Since you are
               asking me what I want, then I will tell you clearly. Here I can exist for the
               Republic not only in two ways: as a dictator with unlimited powers or as a
               simple soldier. You choose”. It was vain to hope that Mazzini would be con-
               vinced to change into an open dictatorship – and even one that was not con-
               ferred to him – a popular government led by an elected Triumvirate that was
               in keeping with his political ideals; on the other hand, it is clear that
               Garibaldi did not act for personal interest or ambition in his request that the
               direction of political and military affairs had to be put into the hands of a sin-
               gle Head; this is the supreme and only means, when the enemy is at the
               gates.
                  Garibaldi was not appointed as dictator, nor was he appointed as com-
               mander in chief, instead of Roselli. The latter, by an order dated June 2 nd ,
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