Page 13 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

INTRODUCTION

A number of factors combined,
beginning in the late 1800s,
to transform spying into Intelligence .
1

In modern warfare, as the belligerents belatedly
realized, communication was inseparable from
its nemesis, communication intelligence .
2

The InTellIgence ManageMenT

During the World War I, even the covert and silent conflict that the Intelligence Services ruthlessly
fought in parallel with the battlefield struggle, required profound changes in operational methods
and, above all, in the way of conceiving Intelligence.
The multiplicity and extension of combat fronts, together with the refinement of investigation
methods generated an overwhelming variety and quantity of data to be analysed, selected, and
integrated for providing the Armed Forces Headquarters with a useful and timely framework of
predictable enemy intents. The need to quickly match the emerging challenges contributed to
produce profound qualitative and quantitative changes in the organisation and management of the
intelligence services that, at the end of the war, turned out to be extremely different with respect
to the beginning.
To work effectively, the information systems also needed to be supported by ‘networks’ capable of
transferring the information gathered by various, numerous, and even remotely located ‘sensors’
toward bodies that selected and fused data before sending them to the decision-making centres.
At a first glance, one can easily spot the analogy between the information structures set up during
the war and some data networks that were implemented several years later to meet needs already
evident during WWI.
Since all the above changes were rather unpredictable when the war broke out, one can understand
the difficulties encountered by Intelligence Services in addressing the new defies and in changing
mentalities and structures. In the warring armies, the innovation occurred gradually, at a different
pace and efficiency, depending on several factors such as the expertise in the field gained in previous
wars and during peace times, the readiness to change shown by decision-making structures and, last
but not least, the awareness of national and military leaders regarding the increasing importance
of the new aspects of Intelligence.
Speaking about the Italian army, Odoardo Marchetti, head of the Intelligence Service during the last
phase of the war, wrote in his book: “when the Intelligence Office joined the campaign, it shared
the narrow outlook of several other organisations mobilised during ‘our’ war. But, especially at
a later stage, it willingly or unwillingly had to broaden its horizons around its centre of activities

1 Michael Warner, The rise and falls of intelligence. An International Security History, Georgetown University Press,
Washington DC, 2014, p. 8.
2 Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, Telecommunications and International Politics, Oxford University Press, 1991,
p.153.

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