Page 209 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

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385000 tons. Evidendy che Bourbons were dead serious in rheir Adamic commit·
mem. The Spanish elfon was esscnrially defcnsive and is thus easy w underscand.
But che French naval expansion represcnred n deliberate choice in which che French
governmenr showed char it regarded che sc.ruggle for c.rade and colonies as more
imporcam chan hegcmony in ltaly, Germany or the Netherlands, the tradicional
Freoch bardefields. Great Briroin and Spaio had al.ready more or less curned cheir
backs on Eu.ropean power struggles aod now France did che same. Western Eu-
rope was rapidly beconùng pare of a growing Aclantic hemisphere where invesc-
mencs in rrade, colon ics and naval forccs were regarded as essential both for nacions
a n d sociecies.
In 1770 che tensions almost resulred in a war. nominally abouc che contro!
of such a disrant piace as che Falkland lslancls or the Malvinas. Acrually Spain and
Briroin were imerested in che future of che huge Paci fie area. The peaceful dipJo.
madc soludon of this conflict for a ti me led ro of ali in naval spending, especially
in France. But soon an armed conflict a rose withio the British Adaotic empire which
finally crupted io another maritime war. The revolt of the British colonies led co
increased preparations in rhe French dockyards which in 1777· 78 resulred in a
greac shipbuilding program. From 1776 co L 780 French warships rocalling 120000
tons were la.unched while Spain during chese years launched around 35 000 cons.
The Bricish made considerable efforrs, around 110000 rons, but thcy slipped back.
In 1780, a Brirish oavy of 370000 rons - the same size as cwenry years earlicr
- faced a French navy of 270000 cons and a Spanish r\avy o( 200000 cons. [n
addirioo, Briroin had arracked che Necherlands in order co put pressure on neutra!
trade wirb the American rebels, but thac added another navy of 70000 consto her
enemies. During che decisive year of 1781 Bricain hnd co fighe a defensive war against
eh ree powcrs with a quantitarive superioricy of almosc 50 per cene. In che aurumn
of rhat ycar a British barde flcec was unable to force thc blockadt: of a superior
French fleer oucside rhe Chesapeake. And so che fare of a large pare of che Brirish
army in Norch America was sealed.
The end of che War of American lndependence io no way eoded che naval
cace in Aùantic hcmisphere. Traditionally, politica! hisrory looses inrerest in At·
lancie questions after 1783 and arremion is turned ro the French Revolucion and
rhe revolurionary wars in Europe. Bue che decision-makers of che l780s had no
inkling thar a greac conrinenral power struggle was imminent in Europe. This is
clearly reflected in cheir shipbuilding efforts, especiaUy in France. Thar country con-
rinued to increase her navy throughour rhe l780s, launching around 200000 cons
o( new sbi~. Spain graduaUy incre.ased her otw construcdon activiry a od launched
half as much. Whilc: Britain was sadsfied with com.plc:ting che warsbips ordered
during rhc: war, che cwo Bourbon powers concinued co srarc building nc:w warships
ac a. rapid rate uncil the early 1790s. Another grear spender on shipbuilding in
che 1780s was th.e Durch navy. Ships tota.lling more chan 100000 cons wc re launched
as a result o( the British arrack. This nation incceasingly began ro fear British or