Page 255 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

U.S NAvY IN WORLI) WAR l Af\:0 Il 221
and ìts Naval Overseas Transporr Service carried over supplìes. Moreover, ic lem
che Allies 8 billion of dollars, provided navaJ railway guns, and provided leader-
ship wben it joined che Allìed Naval Council (ANC) formed in December 1917.
Sims knew thar his navy had helped win the war, bue he also believed rhot
ir had made various misrakes. In hearings held before Senare commirree in 1920
he charged char forar leasr che fìrsr six monrhs of che war che Navy had becn unpre-
pared and slow to act. He posed three major questions: l) was che Navy prepared
for war? 2) was rbe Navy in good materia! condirion to fighe a war? 3) did che
Deparcmeot enter che war wirh well considered policies and ptans? To eacb ques-
tion he answered "No." The result, he allegcd, was thar his Navy had delayed vic-
rory for four monrhs and had cose che Allied cause 2.5 million rons of shipping,
500000 lives, and 15.5 million of dollars.
Particularly Daniels and Ben so n rceoned eh a e che lac-k of American war plans
was immacerial because Allied naval plans to scrangle Germany by naval blockade
had been followed. True, some mismkes had been made, and adminiscrarioo couid
have been improved somewhac- bue nor by che naval generai staff sysrem Sims
advocaced. Neicher aie power nor science bad concribu.red much co viccocy, bur
America's producrive capac.iry bad supplied the equipmenc, and supplies for rhe
men who gave the Allies che margin they need co defeat Germany.
W orld War U differed from World War l in the belligerenrs involved, Allied
command relationsrups, geograpby, equipmenr, and operarions. On one side, rhe
belligerents were now the Axis Powers. After faim-hearted artemprs ac remaining
neu.cral, the Unired Scares veered ftom being a non-belligerenr co a co-belligerenr.
By 1940 ic was fu.rnishing various aUies fìnanc.ial supporr and supplies denied rhe
A.xis powers and gready expanding its navy. By 1941, ir was in effect carrying on
ASW in che Atlancic. Afrer chejapanese arcack on Pearl Harbor, insread ofhaving
one admiral commanding forces in an Aclantic war, thejoinr Chiefs of Staff QCS)
and Combined Chiefs of Sraff (CCS) provided che Alli es strategie poli ci es fora global
war, with beacing Hicler the prime consideracion. M ajor novel weapons sysrems
included new airc.raft types, aircrafr cart:iers, amphibious sbjps, and che aromic
bomb. Boch in the Atlamic bur especially in che Pacifìc, amphibious operations
were undertaken.
There being few ASW craft, American shipping suffered rerribly f'fom Febru-
ary ro Oetober 1942 from U-boats operating off tbe Easrern coasc of che U niced
Srares and in che Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The siruacion eased afrer Ad m.
Ernesc). IGng, botb Cb.ief of Naval Operarions (CNO) and Commander-in-Cbief
(COMINCH), creared a Tenth Fleer in May 1943 ro direcr ASW in rhe Atlantic.
Soon all merchanr sbips ar sea could coum on baving surface escorrs. Vicrory over
che U-boar was fìnally achieved by the use of aircrafr, some o n esco re carciers, im-
proved deprh charges, ahead-thrown weapons, radar and sonar, and tbe bombing
of U-boat fac.ilicies and manufacruring plants in Europe.
Unable to invade the European concinenr in 1942. the Allies substiruted ca.m-
paigns rhac c.leared Axis forces from North Africa and Sicily and by September