Page 277 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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tHe soutH afriCan air forCe: HistoriCal notes and involvement in tHe korean war

After North Korean invasion of South Korea, the South Korean and UN forces were
pushed down to the southern extremity of the peninsula. A brilliant UN offensive and
the amphibious landings at Inchon, push the North Korean forces the Chinese border
in the north which resulted in a Chinese intervention. UN forces were again forced
into a haphazard retreat south. By the end of June 1951, however, it seemed that the
Communist forces were ready to negotiate and that the UN objectives might be in
22
sight. What is however of interest is the preceding two months, the role of air power
and the air offensive, together with the place of the SAAF’s 2 Squadron (2 Sqn) in
these events. 2 Sqn was heavily engaged in the intense air war during this critical
phase of the war, and South African pilots gained a formidable reputation for getting
the job done, as one US officer stated: “We always gave them the dirty or tricky jobs
that no one else wanted because we knew that they would handle them”. 23

The Ground Situation

The ground situation in the sixty-four days before 24 June 1951 can be divided
into two periods: from 22 April to 19 May the UN forces successfully resisted the
“Fifth Phase Offensive” by combined Chinese and North Korean Forces; while from
20 May to 24 June the UN forces launched an offensive that achieved the stabilization
of a Main Line of Resistance (MLR) - for the most part just north of the 38th parallel.
This MLR was to remain virtually static until the end of the war (see Map 1).
By 21 April 1951 the UN forces had established themselves along the Utah and
Kansas Phase lines after a successful offensive. On 22 April 1951 the Communist
24
Forces attacked the US I and IX Corps positions in strength in an attempt to recap-
25
ture Seoul. Although they did not achieve the objective, General Van Fleet, who
took over from General Ridgway on 11 April (who succeeded General MacArthur),
was forced to withdraw to the No-name line by 30 April. The Communist offen-
26
sive halted and Van Fleet immediately replied with an offensive aimed at denying
the enemy the opportunity to build-up for a new offensive, threatening their sup-
ply routes in the Hwachon area and the so-called ”Iron Triangle”. A policy of hot
pursuit was proclaimed over the 38th parallel. The UN advance achieved some
27
success although it was slowed by rain on 27-28 May. The retreating enemy ground
forces, compelled to move during the day, was exposed to air attacks and by the end
of May the UN forces had re-established themselves along the Kansas line. They

22 J.W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, second edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, 1965, p. 490.
23 H. Heitman, South African Armed Forces, p. 58.
24
J. Miller, O.J. Carroll & M.E. Tackley, Korea, 1951-1953, Office of the Chief of Military History,
Washington (S.A.), pp. 20-27.
25
Ibid., p. 103.
26
Ibid., pp. 102-107.
27
Ibid., p. 109.