Page 278 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

278 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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consolidated this position with barbed wire, cleared fields of fire, created minefields,
constructed shelters and concentrated artillery. General Ridgway, UN Commander-
in-Chief (UNCINC), authorized local advances to gain more favourable ground for
defence and Van Fleet launched Operation Piledriver on 1 June 1951, which was
to bring the US I and IX Corps to the Wyoming line by 15 June 1951. During this
advance they encountered heavy enemy resistance organised in depth, as they ap-
proached the base of the ”Iron Triangle”. 28

The Air Situation

The air war during this period was characterized by two features: an intensi-
fied interdiction by the Far East Air Force (FEAF) into which SAAF, ROKAF and
RAAF elements were incorporated, and the implementation of a revised air war plan
by the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) in mid-June. The FEAF interdiction
campaign was named Operation Strangle and its objective was to isolate the MLR
from its sources of supply in North Korea and Manchuria. A strip of territory stretch-
ing east-west across Korea, between 38° 15’N and 39° 15’N, was divided into three
th
interdiction zones, a zone being allocated each to the 5 Air Force, the Navy and the
st
1 Marine Air Wing. The enemy road and rail systems were placed under 24-hour
attack (see Map 1). 29
The revised air war plan of the CCAF was probably resulted from a conference
between CCAF officers and their Soviet advisers held in Mukden in May 1951. The
failure of the ground offensive was attributed to the CCAF’s failure to gain air supe-
riority over Korea and in an attempt to rectify the situation it was decided that new
‘International Communist Volunteer Air Force’ personnel would assist the CCAF;
efforts to repair the North Korean airfields would be redoubled with the aid of cover
provided by MIG-15’s; nuisance raids would be conducted against the South as soon
as the North Korean airfields could take light aircraft; while Ilyushin ground attack
aircraft (with crews trained by Russian advisers) would support the CCAF ground
forces in a new offensive. 30

The Combat Role of 2 Squadron
In common with other fighter-bomber squadrons of the 5 Air Force, 2 Sqn SAAF
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was very involved in these events and both air and ground crews had to work very
hard to maintain operations. Most of the FEAF fighter-bomber effort centred on
interdiction missions, while the fighter-bombers were also utilised for close support,
rescue and escort missions, or were diverted while en route to interdiction targets.

28
Ibid., pp. 110-111.
29
D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War, MacMillan, London, 1964, p. 376.
30
R.F. Futrell, L.S. Mosley & A.F. Simpson, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Duell,
Sloan and Pierce, New York, 1961, pp. 278-279.