Page 472 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
P. 472

472                                XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

              Hereafter, some temporal cutouts of FEB participation will be portrayed. After a sta-
           bilization period on the Italian front, caused by winter, the spring allowed the offensive
           moviment of the Allied armies in the theater of operations (TO) of the Italian territory.
           This offensive is defined by the OPERATIONS Campaign Manual C100-5 of the Gen-
           eral Staff of the Brazilian Army as a combined operation, as it relates strategic military,
           strategic or operational tactics actions, where ponderable elements of more than one
           armed force under one command take part. In this case, the XV Allied Army Group was
           the major Allied command of both Allied Armies, the V American, and  the VIII British,
           that  would operate in two distinct axes: the foothills of the Apennines (Genghis Khan
           line) and the Po river Valley, respectively.

           2. Development
           2.1 First Phase (15 Sep to 30 Oct 44) in the valley of the river Serchio
              The Allied Army, composed of the U.S. Fifth Army and English Eighth Army, worked
           from Sicily, southern Italy, pushed the German Army to the North. The 1st Expedition-
           ary Infantry Division (EID) was part of the IV Army Corp, on the western flank of the
           Fifth Army and its mission in this offensive operation would be advanced to positions
           of winter and move against Montese - which was characterized as the bloodiest battle of
           history of FEB and it would highlight the allied offensive, to have unbalanced the Ger-
           man defensive mechanism in the area.
              FEB mission was to occupy the land dominated by elevations occupied by the enemy
           (German 114th Light Division), which was located next to the main axis of troop move-
           ment and the starting line (LP) of the attack. Thus, to reach Bologna, it was necessary
           to break the Gothic Line a line of fortifications in the Apennines about 280 km long,
           from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic Sea, as already mentioned above. If they could break
           through the Gothic Line, the Allies could use a road known as Route 64.
              The strategic objective was to release, before the arrival of winter, the northern Italy,
           making up the junction with the troops operating in France. However, the offensive is
           held, for they are taken by the V U.S. Army, VI Corps (3 Infantry Divisions) and the
           French Expeditionary Corps (7 divisions) to be employed in the French front, which was
           thus substantially strengthened after the allied landing in Normandy.
              There already were three months that American and British afflicted unsuccessfully
           Bologna – main accident of German defensive. Bologna resisted, and in fierce counter-
           attacks, German troops inflicted the most severe losses, the Fifth Army of the United
           States (U.S.) and the Eighth English Army. As a result of the German resistance in the
           region, it was created the myth of the impregnability of the Gothic Line.
              Our Detachment arrived in this critical phase of the war and was incorporated into
           the IV Army Corps, under the command of Gen Willis Crittenberger, subordinate to the
           shorn V Army, under the command of Gen. Mark Clark.

           2.2. Second Stage (15 Sep to 30 Oct 44) in the valley of the river Reno
              At this stage of the operations FEB clenched on the foothills of the Belvedere bas-
           tions, Monte Castello and Castelnuovo. There was the dominance of the quota of Monte
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