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nah commenced. Then the frigate SAS President Kruger was sent out on patrol (departed
from Simon’s Town on 5 November), with the combat support ship SAS Tafelberg also
sent north to replenish the other SAN units; and, if necessary, provide logistical support
to land forces. Initially the President Kruger spent some three weeks in the vicinity of
the mouth of the Cunene River, ostensibly on a fisheries-protection patrol, but in real-
ity to stand by in case she had to assist in evacuating civilians and/or military person-
nel. SAS President Kruger was relieved by her sister ship, SAS President Steyn on 20
November 1975. Just as SAS President Kruger, SAS President Steyn was also to keep
radio silence and avoid contact with other ships. She was also to monitor and record the
ground forces’ radio transmissions, and intercept MPLA radio traffic – for later analysis. 5
On 27 November 1975, Brig. B de W Roos, contacted SAS President Steyn by radio
and asked to be evacuated from Ambriz, to the north of Luanda. Capt. AS Davis let him
know that Ambriz was unsuitable for such an operation and that he and his party had to
move to the small harbour of Ambrizette, a small fishing village 70 km further north.
Davis now also broke radio silence in an effort to get the necessary approval from Navy
Headquarters in Pretoria – which was duly given. By 04h24 in the early hours of 28
November, Roos and company signalled that they were ready to be evacuated, albeit
that it had to take place from the beach at the town, because the small harbour had no
pier. The frigate was 3,5 nautical miles off the coast, when, at 04h40, Davis sent three
Gemini boats, under the command of Lt RN Erleigh, towards the beach, followed soon
by the ship’s cutter. Erleigh took his Gemini boat to the shore near the town square, and
then ordered the other boats to follow. When it became clear that the boats would not be
able to evacuate all the men and equipment before sunrise (which would be at 07h10),
Davis ordered the ship’s SAAF Wasp helicopter to fly out to the shore to pick up Roos’s
communications and cryptographic gear. Capt. (SAAF) Ben van der Westhuizen and
his flight engineer (Sgt BB Smit) took off with their Wasp at 05h54 – first to bring on
board Brig. Roos and two of his men. At 06h43 the boats arrived back at the ship, and
at 06h50 the Wasp landed for the last time before SAS President Steyn turned back out
to the deep sea. In total the boats and Wasp helicopter of SAS President Steyn picked up
nine South African officers, 15 other ranks, two civilians, as well as equipment, from the
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beach near Ambrizette – and took them to Walvis Bay. This joint operation between the
South African land, air and naval forces was limited; but it was successful.
Some SADF forces advanced to some 20 km from Luanda, but were then ordered
to halt – and then to withdraw. The SADF land forces, with the support of the SAAF
and – in particular the SAN – were probably in a position to have captured Luanda,
as well as most, if not all, the other Angolan port cities; and could then have handed
them over to UNITA and/or FNLA control. That would have made it very difficult, if
not impossible, for the Soviet Union and its allies to continue to support the MPLA.
But by mid-November 1975, the Soviet Union supplied massive aid to the MPLA, the
5 Spies, pp. 147, 168, 174-176; Through the periscope: South African submarines (Simon’s Town, 1999),
pp. 48, 65; W Steenkamp, South Africa’s Border War 1966-1989 (Gibraltar, 1989), p. 51.
6 Steenkamp, pp. 51-52; C Bennett, Three frigates (Durban, 2006), pp. 159-166; Spies, pp. 141-142; Du Toit,
pp. 231-232; P Stiff, The silent war: South African recce operations 1969-1994 (Alberton, 1999), pp. 130-131.

