Page 614 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
P. 614

614                                XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

           United States of America (USA) and other Western countries had withdrawn support
           from South Africa, and the SADF faced the possibility of an all-out conventional war
           in Angola – something the South African government was not prepared to risk. These
           military, but especially political considerations, eventually made the South African gov-
           ernment decide to withdraw from Angola. The last South African troops left Angola on
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           27 March 1976.  Although most of the fighting during Operation Savannah was done
           by the South African land forces, supported by SAAF aircraft and helicopters, the SAN
           played a small but nevertheless noteworthy role, assuring no foreign intervention from
           the Atlantic seaboard, and participating in limited joint operations.

           3.  Electronic and other patrol work
              While these events were taking place “up north” and “on the border”, the security
           situation on the “home front” in South Africa deteriorated. This was mainly due to the
           riots that broke out in Soweto on 16 June 1976, and which spread to other areas. The
           next year the black consciousness leader Steve Biko died in police custody. These events
           led to international indignation and condemnation, further isolated the apartheid regime,
           which in turn led to harsher means to quell opposition – and which led to the imposi-
           tion (on 4 November 1977) of an all-embracing mandatory arms embargo by the United
           Nations (UN) against South Africa. The SAN, in particular, was hard hit, because it led
           to the cancellation of the delivery of two “Agosta” class submarines and two Type 69A
           light frigates, nearing completion in French yards. 8
              The South African government had anticipated an arms embargo and had placed an
           order for three missile-carrying fast attack craft (called strike craft by the SAN) to be
           built in Israel, followed by a further six similar (albeit slightly modified) strike craft built
           in South Africa. These small ships were designed for operations in the Mediterranean,
           but the SAN had to operate them in the stormy seas around the coast of South Africa. In
           due course these small ships were also deployed over long distances by the SAN for pa-
           trol work along the coast of Angola, and also in support of Special Forces; as a matter of
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           fact, for nearly 30 years the strike craft formed the backbone of the SAN’s surface fleet.
              SAN submarines and frigates continued to do operational patrols along the Angolan
           (and Mozambican coast), with the survey ship SAS Protea also deployed to do elec-
           tronic surveillance.  One of the reasons why the Soviet Union did not become involved
           in the war on a larger scale, was the presence of SAN submarines. Furthermore, the
           SAN’s submarines probably also played an important role with regard to shallow water
           operations – including surveillance and the gathering of information; which could also
           be of value in joint operations. Another ship that was apparently used for electronic
           surveillance along the coast of northern SWA and Angola, in support of the SADF’s war
           effort, was the Department of Transport’s former Antarctic supply and research ship, the
           RSA. She was taken over by the SAN and commissioned on 23 April 1978; officially

           7    Scholtz,  pp. 13-29.
           8  Du Toit, pp. 281-289; TD Potgieter, “Another apartheid dilemma: corvettes for the South African Navy”,
              New Contree 47, September 2000, pp. 94-95.
           9    Du Toit, pp. 297-309.
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