Page 619 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

619
ActA
1989 inventory is compared with that of 1975 (i.e. when the SAN for the first time took
part in joint operations during the Namibian War of Independence – se also Section 2,
supra), it is clear that in the course of the war the SAN underwent major changes; for
example, it lost all its major surface combat ships (namely two destroyers and three frig-
ates), without replacing them with similar types of ships. While in 1975, 21 of the SAN’s
26 “major” warships were British-built, the Navy’s 24 “major” hulls by 1989 consisted
of only five British-built ships, with the others coming from France (three submarines),
Israel (three strike craft), Germany (two minehunters), and Denmark (SAS Tafelberg),
while the other ten were built in South Africa (albeit that only two were locally de-
signed). The 1989 SAN was indeed a completely different navy than the 1966 navy. By
1989 the SAN could support land operations (in particular Special Forces) better than
ever before, and it had a strong anti-surface capability – but it had completely lost its
surface ASW ability. The SAN had lost its blue water capability, and was geared towards
defending South Africa’s ports and coastal waters – albeit that, thanks to its joint opera-
tions during the war, it had shown that it was still a force to be reckoned with, was able
to project power, and could support Special Forces over long distances.
In an effort to place the SAN’s role in joint operations in the years 1966-1989 in per-
spective, it is necessary to take cognisance of the problems and frustrations experienced
by the SAN during the war years, as well as indicate the extent to which the war affected
the SAN. In the light of the fact that South Africa’s land and air forces bore the brunt of
the fighting in SWA and in Angola, defence spending would focus on the requirements
of these forces, and the SAN was accordingly scaled down. Consequently the SAN also
had to change its focus and policies. Ships were discarded due to a lack of funds and a
shortage of personnel. Throughout the war years, and for several years beyond, budgetary
constraints hampered the SAN in its day-to-day functioning, as well as with regard to the
acquisition of new equipment. This continued until in the years 1998 to 2008, when three
new submarines and four new frigates were ordered, built and eventually commissioned.
Today (2013) the SAN is a relatively modern but still very small navy – too small for
a country that aspires to play a meaningful role in Africa, and even on the world stage.
The Navy’s relatively new submarines and frigates can play a role in joint operations, but
SAS Drakensberg is the SAN’s only surviving combat support ship. The Navy is in need
of a helicopter-carrying dock ship (LHD) to project power more effectively and to enable
the post-1994 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to make a more meaning-
ful contribution towards peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
A lack of unclassified archival sources (and the probable “loss” of a certain percent-
age of archival sources) makes it impossible to give full credit to the SAN for their
military achievements during the Namibian War of Independence and the war in Angola
in the years 1966 to 1989, in particular with regard to joint operations – with special
reference to their involvement in clandestine operations, when they supported Special
Forces. As far as possible, this role must still be thoroughly researched. After all: the
history of the SAN’s involvement in limited joint operations in the war years, forms part
of the SAN’s fascinating history.