Page 576 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

1216 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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da ridere”), “a taking of possession or little more” . In other words, it offered the occa-
sion for an easy triumph coupled with the prestige of a war waged against an enemy “to
be valued as any other European army” but ready “to give up […] as soon as it could be
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done with some dignity” .
The Turco-Italian war and the dream of a new country
Not surprisingly, the aborted fulfilment of these expectations proved deeply disap-
pointing. In 1929, sketching a picture of the Italian Army at the eve of World War I and
reflecting on the impact of the Libyan experience, General Felice de Chaurand de Saint
Eustache (1857-1944) sombrely remarked: “the events of the [Libyan] campaign had
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not enough impact on the country” . In his opinion, the war was unable “to produce
a deep reawakening in the population, unnerved by a long peace and weakened by hu-
manitarian and pacifist doctrines”.
After closing the Libyan parenthesis (at least in Mr Giolitti’s opinion), he returned
to his pedestrian politics: shunning every ideal; aiming only at associating the bourgeoi-
sie’s interests with the proletariat’s rights. Insisting in respecting that freedom of reun-
ion, press, association, and strike that, if made possible a relevant economic elevation of
the working class, also contributed in distorting the character of an industrious people
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and in shaking its faith in the future, due to continuous demagogic perturbations .
Far from of being a cathartic experience, the war further fuelled the frustrations that
had led to its outbreak. The ‘treason’ by the Arab population, which the war was sup-
posed to free from the ‘Turkish yoke’; the poor preparation of the army in the field;
the rivalries among the commanders; the harsh living conditions; the cold (when not
openly hostile) attitude of the European powers, all contributed in fostering this feeling.
Increasingly evident, a gap emerged between the image of the war and its conduct. The
worsening of the relations with the press was a proof in this direction. Another proof
was the blooming of “an unprecedented triumph of rhetoric […] of which is hard to save
a single verse, so much disgusting is the adulation, and unbearable the emphasis, the

8 On the aircrafts, see f. pedriali, L’aeronautica italiana nelle guerre coloniali. Libia 1911-1936. Dallo sbarco
a Tripoli al governatorato Balbo, Rome, [2008]; see also Cronistoria dell’Aeronautica militare italiana, esp.
vols III-V, Rome, 1989 (first ed., 1928). On the lessons learned in the field of the counterinsurgency, espe-
cially in the bloody recapture of Tripoli after Sciara Sciat and in the ensuing penetration towards the interior
of the country, see f. de cahUrand de saint eUstache, Gli insegnamenti tattici della guerra italo-turca e
l’addestramento delle truppe per la battaglia, Turin, 1914. However, the operational limits of the Italian
forces – especially when facing “a highly mobile [enemy], master in ambushes, swift in its moves, and with
a deep knowledge of the environment” – were well known to both the foreign observers and the country’s
military leaders. On the issue, see l. tùccari (ed), I governi militari della Libia (1911-1919), 2 vols, Rome,
1994, and, more recently, f. saini fasanotti, Libia 1922-1931. Le operazioni militari italiane, Rome, 2012.
9 l. cadorna, Lettere famigliari, ed. by Raffaele Cadorna, Milan, 1967, p. 82, quoted in l. goglia - f. grassi,
Il colonialismo italiano da Adua all’Impero, Rome - Bari, 1993 (first ed., 1981), p. 159.
10 cadorna, Lettere..., cit., p. 82; on the Turkish troops, see corpo di stato maggiore, Manuale dell’ufficiale in
Tripolitania, Rome, 1911, quoted in goglia - grassi, Il colonialismo..., cit., pp. 161-63.
11 f. de chaUrand de saint eUstache, Come l’esercito italiano entrò in guerra, Milan, 1929, p. 227. De Chau-
rand was commander of the Third special division during the recapture of Tripoli in November 1911. On his
life, see – despite its quite uncritical approach – p. merla, Il generale de Chaurand e la dignità della memo-
ria. 1910-1916. Il Novecento italiano in 6 anni di storia, Bergamo, 2009.