Page 577 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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artificial character, and the gloomy solemnity” . However,
[t]hat ‘rhetoric’, or ‘literature’, was mainly rooted into a sentiment […] almost of lib-
eration from the daily evil of Giovanni Giolitti, from the almost pointless game of
Parliament and parties. After so much foreign politics, so many treaties, agreements,
protocols […] after so much chatting about Tripoli, it was a pleasure to see Italy, finally,
moving and entering into action […] Moving, going as a unity, as a nation. […] It was
the vindication of painful memories. Of events that seemed impossible erase, and that
provided reasons – or pretexts – to the foreign press to spread rumours in times of
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deeper contrasts or polemics .
It is in this perspective, merging past and future, and contrasting theoretically and prac-
tically with the worthless praxes of the domestic politics that took place the transfiguration
of the Turco-Italian war from a colonial campaign into a national war, made by the people,
for the people. The war for the ‘Fourth shore’ became a complement to the process of na-
tional unification; a valuable alternative to an irredentism that the superior interests of the
Triple Alliance formally banned from the public discourse. This, in its turn, reverberated
on the image of the Armed Forces, especially of the Army that in Giolitti’s age “showed all
the symptoms of a deeply rooted malaise” . The process took different forms. The “effi-
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ciency” of the mobilization and the “far-sightedness” of the preparations “made the great-
est impression in the country because Italy aimed at being what it was not: well-organized,
methodical and efficient” . Due to the war, “in the country, the image of the soldier started
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to reflect a new and brighter light […] Those who wanted to give to the Risorgimento […]
a fulfilment in their moral life […] who felt the need for greater internal order, hierarchy,
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rule, discipline, and were looking for a model […] [now] could look […] at the Army” .
Despite shortcomings, weaknesses and improvisation, and despite the criticisms moved to
the higher commands for their tactical and strategic mistakes, this “new and brighter light”
left a lasting mark. After the cries that the suppression of the turmoil in 1898 had raised,
and after the fears for a military involvement in the following ‘anti-democratic reaction’,
the Army re-imposed as one of the pivots of the country’s unity.

12 “Chiusa la parentesi libica – o almeno così reputava l’on. Giolitti – egli tornò alla sua politica pedestre, ri-
fuggente da ogni ideale, intenta soltanto ad associare gli interessi della borghesia con i diritti del proletariato,
perseverando nel rispetto di quella libertà di riunione, di associazione, di stampa e di sciopero, che, se aveva
reso possibile un notevole elevamento economico delle classi operaie, contribuì anche a falsare il carattere di
un popolo laborioso, ed a scuoterne la fiducia nel suo avvenire, per le continue perturbazioni demagogiche”.
de chaUrande de saint eUstache, Come l’esercito..., cit., p. 229.
13 del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia..., cit., pp. 144-51.
14 “Ma quella ‘retorica’ o ‘letteratura’ aveva la sua prima radice in un sentimento […] quasi di liberazione dal
gramo quotidiano di Giovanni Giolitti, dal poco concludente giuoco del Parlamento e dei partiti. Era il pia-
cere, dopo tanta politica estera, tanti trattati, accordi, protocolli […] e parlottare di Tripoli, il piacere di veder
l’Italia finalmente muoversi, passare all’azione […] muoversi, andare come unità, come nazione […] Era il
riscatto da ricordi dolorosi, da fatti che parevano indelebile storia e seguitavano a dare motivo o pretesto al
pettegolezzo del giornalismo internazionale nei momenti di inasprito contrasto o polemica”. g. volpe, L’im-
presa di Tripoli 1911-12, Rome, 1946, p. 74.
15 J. whittam, Storia dell’esercito italiano, Milan, 1979, p. 222 (first ed., The Politics of the Italian Army, Lon-
don - Hamden, CT, 1977).
16 s. romano, La quarta sponda. La guerra di Libia 1911-1912, Milano, 2005 (first ed., 1977), p. 89.