Page 492 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

492 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Being aware of the strategic situation of their country, the Czechoslovak leaders have
repeatedly affirmed their loyalty towards Moscow during the “Prague Spring”. Their foreign
policy was molded to the exigencies of Kremlin, hoping that the latter would accept the
reformation of the system from within. However, Ceaučescu’s support did not aim at the
reforms, but only sought to encourage the distancing of Czechoslovakia from Moscow. From
the point of view of Bucharest, what was needed was the immediate appearance of a dissident
ally within the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, Romania continuing to be a member of both
organizations. Also, Ceaučescu has consistently expressed his position on the Czechoslovak
issue in front of the representatives of CPSU and USSR. From this point of view, the meeting
from July 12, 1968, between Nicolae Ceaučescu and V. Basov, the soviet ambassador in Bu-
charest, is very revealing, the Romanian leader arguing that “some existing antisocialist ele-
ments are not capable to endanger the socialist construction … we know the communist party
and the Czechoslovak working class and we trust them that they will not give up the socialist
1
path” . “There must be understood that the measures taken in Czechoslovakia – the Roma-
nian leader continued – are an internal issue of the party and the comrades must be supported
2
… the Party Congress should be allowed to solve this problem democratically” . Without
any doubt, this attitude individualized Romania in the communist bloc, but also accentuated
its isolation within the Warsaw Pact, which eventually lead to the exclusion of Bucharest
from the decisional process of the alliance concerning the “Prague Spring”. The leadership
in Bucharest felt the consequences. During the meeting with N. Basov on July 12, 1968, N.
Ceaučescu directly expressed his grievance: “I must tell you that for us it is impossible to
understand the convocation of a group of parties from the socialist countries, at the same time
3
avoiding other parties from socialist countries” . Unlike Kremlin and the leaders of the
states that swore allegiance to its policy, both Tito and Ceaučescu wanted to strengthen the
support given to the Dubček regime by visiting Prague (Tito on August 9-11 and Ceaučescu
on August 15-17, 1968). Going even further, Ceaučescu not only warned A. Dubček about
the imminent invasion, but also signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation between Ro-
4
mania and Czechoslovakia, replacing the one from 1948 . all these events were perceived
by Moscow as an attempt of constituting a socialist “Little Entente” , obviously dissident
5
towards USSR. For Leonid Brezhnev, it was a “collusion on the Danube” .
6
Although predictable, the invasion of Czechoslovakia took by surprise the Romanian
leader, who immediately summoned the party and state structures of decision in order to
assert the new situation and to determine the needed measures. The meeting of the Execu-

1 A.N.I.C., Fond CC al PCR, Secčia Relačii Externe, Dos 59/1968, Informare din partea CC al PCUS, transmisč
de ambasadorul URSS la Bucurečti, în audienčč la Nicolae Ceaučescu, privind situačia din Cehoslovacia,
nepaginat.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem.
4 A.N.I.C., Fond CC al PCR, Cancelarie, Dosar 54/1968, Protocolul Nr. 19 al čedinčei Prezidiului Permanent
al CC al PCR din 8 aprilie 1968 privind textul românesc al proiectului Tratatului de prietenie, colaborare či
asistenčč mutualč dintre România či Cehoslovacia, îmbunčtččit, ff. 2-3, 42-47.
5 Petre Out, “Stimόm mult όi preόuim sprijinul dumnevoastrό”, în “Dosarele Istoriei”, nr. 5 (21)/1998, p. 41-
47.
6 7 Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincerό a poporului român, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucurečti, 1998, p. 507.