Page 493 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

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tive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party of August 21,
1968, which started at half past six in the morning, only a few hours after the invasion, marks
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the climax of the dissident attitude of the Romanian leader . From the stenographic record
of the meeting, judgments of value get through, in contrast with the previous reservations
towards the “Prague Spring”. According to its appraisal, «we found out that in Czechoslo-
vakia the party leadership was in control of the situation and we do not share their point of
view (meaning the Kremlin leaders) that there are counterrevolutionary elements and we
consider the military intervention in Czechoslovakia a serious mistake». Then it came the
firm statement concerning the Romanian policy: «to express the position of our party that
no one, in no way, can arrogate the right to interfere in the affairs of other states, that no one
has any justification to address oneself to some group, that only the government, the party
and the official and elected bodies bear the responsibility, that the Central Committee and
the government calls the entire people to defend Romania’s territorial integrity, not to allow
any kind of interference in the internal affairs of our country. We should consider whether to
bring this declaration to the members of the United Nations. It is clear that the path taken in
Czechoslovakia [i.e. Soviet and allies invasion] is an adventurous one, which creates mistrust
that these states can in any way guarantee the security and then we take all the measures to
safeguard our independence and national sovereignty. Of course, it is understandable that
a difficult situation arises, but we consider we have no other choice. If it ends in a military
clash, the force may eventually prevail, but this is a completely other thing than to allow and
to take part at the subjugation of the country. It is sad that we reached this point towards the
socialist countries, but this is the situation created by irresponsible people» (highlighting by
the author). Therefore, N. Ceaučescu did not exclude a possible war with the USSR and its
loyal allies in case Romania was invaded. As the secretary general of the Romanian Com-
munist Party and member of the Politburo (Emil Bodnčrač) suggested, the provisions of this
declaration «resulted from the proposals of the Permanent Presidium, so they complied with
“the principle of collective leadership”».
During the meeting, the soviet policy was identified with the czarist imperialism, a com-
parison was made with the situation of Romania in 1940 and the policy of the invading
states of the Warsaw Pact was labeled as «fascist», thus indirectly questioning the Romania’s
membership in this alliance. During the same day of August 21, 1968, Nicolae Ceaučescu
addressed himself to the Romanian nation at a grand popular rally in Bucharest, where he
strongly condemned the invasion and asked for the support of the people for his actions.
There were immediately taken steps of military nature in order to strengthen the fighting
capability of the army, given that at the eastern, western and southern borders, the intelligence
services warned about concentration of troops with potential offensive missions against the
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national territory . The concentrations of forces around Romania’s borders were estimated
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at about 10-12 large soviet units, 4-5 large Bulgarian units and 2-3 large Hungarian units .

7 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secčia Cancelarie, Protocolul nr. 32 al čedinčei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR,
în care s-a discutat situačia din Cehoslovacia, 21 august 1968, dosar 133/1968, f. 85-87.
8 AMR, fond D.S.P.A., microfilme, rola 1466, c. 44-45, 48-49, 63.
9 Gl. corp de armatč (r) Ion Gheorghe, Gl. brigadč (r) Corneliu Soare, Doctrina militarό româneascό 1968-
1989, Editura Militarč, Bucurečti, 1999, p. 50.