Page 112 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

614 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

expelled from the islands by the British, and after repeated notes of complaint to the Uni-
4
ted Kingdom, the argument finally reached the United Nations. In 1960 and 1965 the General
Assembly approved Resolutions 1514 and 2065, where a dispute was recognized to exist
5
between Argentina and the United Kingdom about sovereignty over the Malvinas, and both
parties were urged to maintain negotiations without delay.
After a protracted diplomatic process “without any substantial advances in the
negotiations”, in December 1981 the Military Junta of Argentina began to make plans for
6
of a military operation in case of failure in the bilateral talks scheduled for early 1982. “The
patience with Great Britain had come to an end. The 150th anniversary of the British seizure
of the islands in January 1983, appeared as some sort of a limit”. 7

pLanning and scope of the miLitary recovery operation
March 1982 marks the preparation of National Strategic Directive (DENAC) No. 1/82
(Malvinas Case), which is approved by the Military Committee, determining that in view of
the repeated lack of any progress with the United Kingdom it was necessary to contemplate
the use of Military Power for achieving the pertinent political goal.
DENAC 1/82 (Malvinas) established that “Phase 4 – Maintenance of the Military Objec-
tive and Government”, “shall consist of achieving the Administration of the Malvinas, Geor-
gias and South Sandwich Islands under a military governor appointed by the Military Com-
mittee to exercise the executive, legislative and judicial authority”.
In its “Conclusions” (1.12.), the directive expressed that “The Argentine Republic must
resolve a military problem and also a problem as regards the handling of a population which,
even if not being of Argentine origin nor considering itself as such, lives in a territory that we
consider as Argentine and that is going to be returned to the national sovereignty. Therefore,
such population must in no way be considered as hostile and pertaining to an enemy country,
but as a population which must be treated with total correctness and flexibility in order to
gain its good disposition”.
The strategy adopted by Argentina played an influential role in its election to wage a war
in April 1982. The intention was clear among its planners to conduct a swift recovery opera-
tion that would then permit the installation of a government to administer the territory and its
population. “It was a classic case of limited aims/fait accompli, the success of which required
taking surprise military action before the defender recognized the trick and mobilized its
forces. The weaker initiator expected to use a limited military takeover for establishing so-
vereignty; a fait accompli once achieved would not be easily reversed. It acted under a belief
that the defending power would not use overwhelming force or retaliate massively because
of political and diplomatic constraints”. 8
The so-called Military Strategy Directive (DEMIL) 1/82, in its Chapter “Execution”,

4 In January 1833 a group of English soldiers landed from frigate HMS Clio and forcefully ousted the Argen-
tine authorities and population from the Malvinas.
5 Resolution 1514 (14 December 1960); Resolution 2065 (4 January 1966).
6 Resolution 3160 (29 January 1974).
7 Freedman, Lawrence; “Britain and the Falklands War”, page 33
8 Paul, T.V., “Asymmetric Conflicts”, page 155