Page 114 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II
P. 114

616                                XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

           much as possible, without causing unnecessary destruction to private installations or public
           services. as regards the British troops, the bloodlessness requirement involved causing the
           smallest possible number of casualties in order to avoid arising an emotional reaction in the
           British population and government. “There was an additional motive: there was certainty that
           in case of casualties among the population or the defending troops, the British propaganda
           would take advantage of the circumstance to attack the country thus worsening the poor ima-
           ge of Argentina on the subject of human rights.”  13

           pLanning the government of the isLands
              The time available for preparing government actions proved to be limited,  as it was
                                                                              14
           only during the first week of March 1982 that General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri   infor-
                                                                                  15
           med General Mario Benjamín Menéndez about the possibility of a military operation being
           executed in order to occupy the Malvinas and then appoint Menendez as Military Governor.
           Moreover, the secrecy required by the operation delayed the meeting of a group of assistants
           to cooperate with him or the contacts with officers, for which reason the studies and prepara-
           tions were subject to serious difficulties.
              The very few days available between the meeting of the government team and the depar-
           ture for Malvinas were devoted to studying all geographic, human, political, economic and
           other background information available in the archipelago, so as to be in the best possible
           position to face the government taks with some possibility of success.
              the basic tasks to be developed were outlined with a view to later on adjust them on the
           go, according to the reality found on the islands. Among the measures initially contemplated
           by the group were the following: a) replacement of the Executive Council and the Legislature
           by persons without any strong links with the colonial power; b) ensuring the continuity of
           school activities with indispensable modifications aimed at inproving the knowledge of the
           Argentine geography, history and language; c) ensuring and improving the health services;
           d) adjusting the administration of justice and other legal matters, by harmonizing the system
           and code applied on the islands with those in force in Argentina, d) achieving an articulate
           operation of the administration, ensuring the normal payment of goods and services and
           maintaining the economic activities, with an initial reconciliation of the use of the Falkland
           Pound, the Sterling Pound and the Argentine Peso; e) incorporating means or companies
           from the continent, thus displacing or neutralizing the Falkland Islands Company monopoly,
           and diversifying and intensifying economic and tourist activities for the benefit of the islan-
           ders; f) ensuring the normal provision of essential public services such as water, electrici-
           ty, garbage collection, transport between islands; g) continuing with and increasing public
           works such as roads, port installations, etc.; h) replacing personnel indispensable in certain
           services if so required by their condition and attitude as British subjects and especially as
           officers and non-commisioned officers of its armed forces.
              After reconquest of the islands, the original plans contemplated the constitution of a


           13  Büsser, Carlos A., “Operación Rosario”, page 16
           14   The operation was originally scheduled for 15 May 1982 (DEMIL 1/82)
           15   De facto President of the Argentine Republic between 1981-1982. Member of the Military Junta.
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