Page 194 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

696 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

not see as an inconvenience the peacekeeping operation, because besides struggling to pre-
vent turmoil and establish peace in the region the lives of eight million people are at stake in a
very poor country, with the most degraded ecosystem in the world and 80% of the population
living below the poverty line and life expectancy of only 53 years old.
At the beginning the crucial problem of MINUSTAH commander was the infrastructure
and lack of trained soldiers to organize a consistent military apparatus. With no troops at-
tached to the force, General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira took over the Multinational
Force formed basically by Americans, without knowing what troops would constitute the
whole force altogether. There were a lot of promises not always accomplished. When one
expected a battalion a company would follow. Everything depended of will and this was not
enough. action had to be taken.
At the end of July, the challenge was to disarm and demobilize the fighting groups that
acted in the country formed mostly by former Haitian military men. Although the Army was
disbanded there were armed groups with no formal organization spread all over Haiti. They
were not like the guerrilla groups called “chimieres” because they were seen by the popula-
tions as free fighters. Before MINUSTAH arrived in country these groups kept the Interna-
tional Mission at stake.
Still in July the Haitian Provisional Government recognized the former military movement
as legitimate and designated General Ravix Remissainthe as its commander and spokesman
to the legally established authorities. Immediately Ravix began a series of attacks against the
police all over country, trying to hit United of Nation forces.
In these initial months it was very difficult to accommodate the Brazilian force. The few
bases in country were scattered and the force command had to move continuously. Only at
the end of 2004 it was installed at Tabarre University.
There were a lot of problems at the beginning of operation which the principal objective
was to impose peace, defeating armed groups (former military, militias and gangs), keeping
them unarmed. the National Police had to join this operation, acting together with Brazilian
forces. It was also important to reach “hearts and minds” of local population, thru a close re-
lationship with local authorities, non-governmental groups and the people themselves prac-
ticing civic and social programs. The principal aim was to diminish the population suffering,
giving them hope.
The scope of this paper does not allow describing all operations carried out, mostly in
urban areas, inside slums (favelas), places where armed groups acted as masters, protected
most of the time by the local police.
Normally the operations were conducted with different troops from countries participat-
ing in the reconstruction of Haiti. Sometimes the different languages were a big problem.
There were ambushes, siege and assault operations, however urban warfare was predomi-
nant. Slowly the situation became under control, diminishing the violence level.
One of the most violent operations was the rescue of the French Secretary of Exterior
Relations and of the Haitian Minister of Exterior at Cité Soleil after Preval took over. An-
other dangerous situation was when the Brazilians substituted the Jordanians in july 2006,
inside Cité Soleil. As soon as the Jordanians got out the rebels began to threat by hand signs
to decapitate the Brazilian soldiers new in the area. The Brazilians continued fearless to