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theory supported by numerous historical cases is the “enemy-centric” theory of counterin-
surgency warfare where the enemy insurgents are the primary focus of a counterinsurgency
campaign. The British Imperial Army officer C.E Callwell is the most noted example of
this school of thought. It is not to say, however, that within the enemy-centric theory the
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population of the nation where an insurgency exists is not important. Instead it is a matter of
priority and focus from which various counterinsurgency methods other than the population-
centric method might be derived.
Understanding the theoretical and historical premises of the American Army’s new coun-
terinsurgency doctrine is important because it has had a profound effect on how the Army and
its political leaders envision future conflict and America’s military role in the world. If Amer-
ican Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is right and future conflict for America will be along
the lines of Iraqs and Afghanistans then the world can expect more instances of American
military forces in foreign lands protecting the world’s people from a “global insurgency.”
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Focusing on populations did not originate with the American Army’s new Coin doctrine
or with the French Revolutionary War School of counterinsurgency theory from the early
1960s. Shortly after World War I ended in the 1920s air power theorists started to think of
ways to apply the use of the airplane in war directly against the peoples of a nation by drop-
ping bombs on them.
A historical comparison between airpower theorists of the 1920s and the French Revo-
lutionary War School of counterinsurgency can bring into view these two discrete historical
cases and the salient features of each by juxtaposing one to the other. This comparison can
also shed light on the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine.
When making these comparisons a central theme stands out as common in all three cases:
a deliberate focus on peoples and populations as the center element to victory or defeat in
war. In all three cases, if the people and populations are properly handled by a military force
victory in war can be achieved. Of course the way a military force “handled” the population
in war was radically different between airpower theorists and counterinsurgency theorists.
Airpower theorists sought to bomb civilian populations from the air with airplanes dropping
bombs in order to break their will and thus bring about a quick end to a war. the counterin-
surgency theorists of the early 1960s (and today in the American Army currently fighting in
Iraq) sought a radically different approach toward handling peoples and populations in war.
For them, the people were to be protected so that insurgents operating within the population
could be separated out and destroyed; once that was done, victory in counterinsurgency war
could be achieved.
With all three cases (airpower theorists, French Revolutionary War School counterin-
surgency theorists, and the new American coin doctrine) there was an inversion of the ways
military forces traditionally had fought wars. Traditionally when wars were fought between
nation-states the first actions were between the opposing sides’ military forces in large battles
between their armies. At some point as the war progressed and depending on the nature of

9 C.e. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1996,
originally published in 1906); also see Kilkullen interview with Charlie Rose.
10 Transcript of Secretary Robert Gates’s speech to cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point,
21 April 2008, in Stars and Stripes, 22 April 2008.