Page 279 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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aCta
resistance groups, which took the form of armed resistance and guerrilla warfare and speech-
es and more intellectual publications printing propaganda against the occupation; weather in
some years of the occupation, coupled with poor roads, meant that some Marine and GND
battalions would become completely cut off from both central orders and supply, leading to
the need to support their livelihoods from unwilling local populations; finally, Marines in
remote provinces of the country were less likely to encounter translators (and those they did
find were of often questionable loyalty to the military government). The only answer to this
long list of problems was to recruit Dominican citizens into GND units in the provinces and
attempt to build their loyalty toward Marine forces, but few Dominicans were eager to join,
and many of those who did were persecuted as traitors by other Dominicans, especially in
the areas of armed guerrilla resistance, so desertions were highest in those areas. The need
to recruit from the lower, illiterate strata of the population—because the elite were more
likely to oppose the occupation—also meant that the primary incentive offered by Marines
was in stable pay; when resources were scarce, or provinces were cut off from the capital by
poor weather, the new armed recruits were likely to desert and turn to banditry. Further, the
need to remove all elements of caudillo support to end the struggles of the decades-long civil
war meant that the Marines had to avoid recruiting or giving power to the most experienced
members of the Dominican citizenry.
When the GND was finally formed in April of 1917, the stated goals of its creators were
to form a military body that would attempt to retrain, professionalize, and organize a new
Dominican military. This new Guardia Nacional, with an officer corps run and staffed by U.S.
Marines, rapidly replaced all armed Dominican forces in the country, and took as one of its
major missions the continued disarmament of citizens throughout the provinces. During this
time, it also recruited widely for manpower, though in many places those joining were not
immediately given arms. Since the primary goal of the occupation was stated as the building
of infrastructure, the GND was the sector most affected by intermittent budget cuts. Official
Marine accounts detail the disorder of the GND during the first five years (1917-1921), dur-
ing which the GND had six different Marine commandants, only one of whom remained for
more than seven months, budget cuts were a common occurrence (and one such, in 1921,
was so harsh that the Guardia commandant had to cut the entire active enlisted force to 346
men “for lack of funds”), and firearms were so scarce that they were reserved for officers
24
and trumpeters. By June of 1920, over three years after the founding of the GND, there
25
were still no Dominicans above the rank of second lieutenant. Until mid-1921, not one
26
officer above the rank of lieutenant was Dominican. Not until late in 1922, less than two
27
years before the complete withdrawal of U.S. occupation troops, were most company com-
manders Dominican. Further, lack of arms during the early years was sometimes so desperate

24 Only three months after its founding, the GND had an official strength of 16 officers and 575 enlisted men.
25 Fuller, 47-48.
26 Dominican Republic, “General Order No. 14 (Series 1920),” Legajo 1, “Ejército Nacional,” “1920, 6,”
aGN, 2.
27 Dominican Republic, “Muster rolls,” 1921, Legajo 2, “Ejército Nacional,” “1921, 6,” AGN; Dominican
Republic, “General Order No. 27, Series 1919,” June 14, 1919, Legajo 1, “Ejército Nacional,” “1919, 2,”
aGN.