Page 280 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

782 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

for enlisted men that even among those who were actively engaged in battle against armed
resistance in the east, only those Dominicans who distinguished themselves in service were
actually rewarded with the right to carry a rifle or pistol. The rest were expected to run into
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battle with machetes or even more crude weapons, adding to desertion numbers.
Enlistment and retention were also not well systematized for the first five years, however,
especially in the more remote provinces; in fact, the official Marine history of the occupation
points out that, due to the many difficulties, the GND never attained the numerical strength
to act on its own before 1922—the year in which gradual withdrawal was begun. among
29
those Dominican men who did join or remain in the GND between 1917 and 1921, corrup-
tion and abuse of power, under Marine leadership that was too scant to control the newly
armed men, was widespread and often very destructive to the cause of a military government
that was desperately trying to convince the Dominican population that the GND had been
formed with the purpose of improving Dominican lives. To further complicate this problem,
many troops in the interior often went without rations, and therefore tended to “appropri-
ate” local livestock. Yet corruption and abuse of power were difficult to stem under the
30
circumstances, and such behavior often extended to Marines and other U.S. troops in the
interior as well; Dominicans protested that Marines were usually reprimanded and forgiven
such crimes and Dominican GND members often suffered dishonorable discharge or harsher
punishment (usually prison terms and steep fines). This policy of non-tolerance toward Do-
minican misbehavior, strengthened over the years by successive military orders and evolving
prerequisites for recruitment, combined with the many other harsh conditions of the GND
to cause a very high turnover rate for recruits. Official enlistment started at three-year terms
and was later changed later to two-year terms, but even then a high number of recruits did
31
not finish out their enlistment.
Most of the members of the previous military groups did not attempt to join the GND
upon its formation due to distrust of the military government or accusations of treason by fel-
low citizens, but a few, such as Colonel Cabral, did—and distinguished themselves battling
Dominican resistance fighters. The occupying government, however, quickly moved to
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strategically relocate or remove these members from military service. Colonel Cabral, for ex-
ample, was placed in a local governmental position. Most were simply discharged as “unfit”
from the armed forces, often for health reasons, at least officially; memos within the govern-
ment were more specific: One, for example, stated that “Captain Batlle is one of the Guardia
Republicana and is not desired in the new organization.” A small number of these previ-
33
ous military men were integrated into the new U.S.-created force.

28 Dominican Republic, “Orden General 48, Serie 1919,” December 12, 1919, Legajo 1, “Ejército Nacional,”
“I,” AGN.
29 Fuller, 48.
30 Fuller, 32.
31 Dominican Republic, “General Order No. 1,” January 12, 1921, Legajo 3, “Ejército Nacional,” AGN.
32 Dominican Republic, “Orden de Campaña No 3,” August, 1917, Legajo 22, “Gobierno Militar,” “Año 1924,”
aGN.
33 Dominican Republic, Memorandum, Military Government, June 8, 1917, Legajo22, “Gobierno Militar,”
“Folder 1,” AGN.