Page 200 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

198 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

chartered by the Neapolitan government to send reinforcements to the
fortress of Milazzo.
On the morning of the 23 rd the Muette arrived in the harbour, a French
warning of war, whose commander offered himself as intermediary for the
peace negotiations. Garibaldi asked the royal forces a discretionary surrender,
apart from their officers, who he left free to go back to Naples. Bosco replied
that he would surrender only under honourable conditions, provided his gov-
ernment ratified them, and that in the meantime, if forced to defend himself,
he would still do it honourably. Moreover, he added that “if Garibaldi wanted
to attack the fortress, he, with a cigar in his mouth, would wait seated in the
most dangerous place and would be blown up shouting: long live the King!”
rd
On the 23 , four royal frigates appeared in the harbour. The impression
was huge; for a moment, Garibaldi’s troops feared they had to evacuate the
city. But they had been sent to take on board Bosco’s troops and take them
back to the continent; Colonel Anziani disembarked, being tasked with the
negotiations for the surrender. However, also Persano’s naval Division showed
up in the harbour fighting fit, to protect, if needed, the Dictator’s operations.
This wasn’t necessary, anyway: on that same 23 rd the convention was
signed. It was established that the troops go out of the fortress with military
honour, and that the fortress be delivered to Garibaldi with all its equipments
and horses. Two other conventions followed this one, on July 28 th and August
st
1 : in conclusion, the royal forces kept just the citadel of Messina, that, brave-
ly defended by Marshal Fergola, would surrender to General Cialdini only on
th
March 12 , 1861, that is, ten months after the landing of the Mille.
And so the great work had been accomplished: Sicily was freed and
Garibaldi was ready to go to the continent and give the last blow to the
Bourbon’s monarchy, supported in this final act by the Savoy troops.

The undertaking of the Mille appeared almost as a miracle, so unexpect-
ed and huge were its achievements.
If we examine the facts objectively, basing our analysis on documents and
reasoning, we may now say that the lucky outcome of that undertaking was
due to the following reasons:
1° - The decadence of Bourbon political and military institutions, with
their «pious devotion to Francis II»;
2° - The lack of an enlightened mind and a strong hand to face the events
(it would have sufficed to have Filangieri instead of Lanza); the surprising