Page 202 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

200 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

instructions were even contradictory.
This narration already showed their main mistakes. Castelcicala (who
was of Calabrian origin but was born in Richmond in 1790), a survivor of
Waterloo, had been a brave soldier, but was too old and phlegmatic, «good,
but weak», said De Sivo. He was called back by King Francis, who replaced
him with Lieutenant General Ferdinando Lanza, but this change did not
bring anything positive.
Lanza, aged 72, former Chief of Staff of Filangieri, was born in Nocera dei
Pagani from a Palermitan family; he had fought in the campaigns of ‘48 and
‘49; his relatives were all liberals, and this had a great influence on his decisions.
Old and fearful, he arrived after the defeat of Calatafimi, when the rebels
lighted all the mountains surrounding Conca d’Oro, and strange and discour-
aging news was reported, and he lost heart and sent to Naples reports full of
fear. He did not think to better organise his troops in view of the attack that
would be surely launched against the city, nor did he think of supplying them
with food and means, He remained invisible in the royal palace, as in an ivory
tower, and just left his room a few times to ask news from his chief of staff.
In vain did the King invite him several times to launch an offensive.
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The only victory, on May 21 -25 , disorganised and disunited, was the
one against the squads, and not against Garibaldi’s army, who escaped their
threats many times. However, this offensive had put Garibaldi in a very dif-
ficult situation, both in terms of supplies and morale, and therefore it was a
very serious mistake not to push the offensive to its conclusion. Other seri-
ous mistakes made by Lanza were to leave the city almost unprotected on its
eastern side, right where it was more threatened, due to the Gibilrossa camp,
whose existence had been long known, to have ordered all troops to gather in
front of the royal palace to have requested the first truce and to have ordered
Mechel to respect the armistice instead of breaking the negotiations, for
which many excuses could have been found.
The bombardment of Palermo was useless and violent. The armistice, on
the contrary, was almost “a real stroke of good luck for the insurgents, who
really risked with good probability to be buried under the ruined buildings
of Palermo”.
Even Garibaldi acknowledged, “The situation was far from being good.
Palermo lacked weapons and ammunitions, the bombs had dismantled part
of the city, the enemy occupied it with its best troops and held the best posi-
tions; the fleet swept the roads with their artillery and the cannons of the