Page 207 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE 1860 CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 205

However, going to Calatafimi meant meeting the Bourbon troops, who in
the meantime advanced; but this could not worry a commander who had
fought so many battles. A victory would have had an immense moral effect
on the population, whereas a defeat would not have been decisive, since the
possibility of escaping the enemy’s hold still existed, and Garibaldi had many
times demonstrated to be an unrivalled master in this.

3. –The Battle of Calatafimi. - Garibaldi could not have led it better. From
what we read in his “Memoirs”, his intention was to defend only. The reasons
for this were clear and we explained them in the above narration. But, won
by the ardour of the Genoese Carabinieri, he had to change his mind and
launch his troops to the attack, relying almost exclusively on bayonets.
As we saw, Landi’s behaviour was the first cause of Garibaldi’s victory. If the
outcome of the battle had been different, Garibaldi would have been left with just
the option of reaching the hinterland, through Santa Ninfa, and not retracing his
steps, since it would not have been possible to board a ship and set sail again.
The conquest of Calatafimi, where the royal forces had retreated in order,
would have been very difficult, and, on the other hand, Garibaldi could not
have left it behind if he wanted to continue for Castrogiovanni. But Landi
withdrew without a reason, abandoning the fleet, discouraging his soldiers
and boosting the morale of the insurgents; all this confirmed Garibaldi in his
idea to march on Palermo.
Was he entitled to have many hopes? Not yet. From a strategic point of view,
the adverse elements were still unchanged: the city had a garrison with a large
number of soldiers, supported by artillery and fortresses; many were the obsta-
cles to be overcome; supplies and communications were difficult. In favour of
that very risky solution there was only the faith in the revolution. But up to
Alcamo, Partitico and Borsetto, nothing had been jeopardised yet, since the
road network would have allowed Garibaldi to go towards the hinterland.

4. – The Manoeuvres of Renda and Parco. – The many movements from
Renda and Parco between the 19 th and the 24 th of May was understood and
judged in various ways.
th
What was the aim of the stop in the Renda Plain (19 th and 20 ) and the
st
reconnaissance of the 21 ? Many saw in it a sham to deceive Bosco, who was in
Monreale, and make him leave his position. Pecorini explained the attack of the
st
21 with “the aim of distracting the royal forces from their advance on San