Page 209 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE 1860 CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 207

er of Nice rightly exalted this manoeuvre. Was it thought up by Garibaldi
immediately after his retreat from Piana? Bourbon writers denied it. And it
was almost certainly suggested by La Masa, as we said in the narration, but
this does not change Garibaldi’s merit, who took the decision after due con-
sideration and after assessing all pros and cons.
th
In the meantime, with the side manoeuvre of the 25 , Garibaldi did not
jeopardized anything, since while he had the possibility to escape the pursuit
of the Mechel-Bosco column, outnumbering his troops, he could put himself
in the condition of either joining the Sicilian corps of Gibilrossa, as La Masa
suggested, or marching through Villlafrati and Roccapalumba and reaching
Castrogiovanni, as Sirtori requested.
st
In general “those feats made by Garibaldi between May 21 -27 th will
always be remembered as a wonderful example of a war fought by bands
against overwhelming regular troops” (Còrsi). This is not to say, however,
that they had been accomplished according to a pre-ordained plan, as Alberto
Mario believed. Garibaldi could pre-arrange nothing; he, on the contrary,
had to start from the facts on the ground. We therefore believe that Guerzoni
was right when he said: “His plan did not originate as a single plan out of his
wonderful mind, straight off and in a moment; it was meditated over time,
and slowly prepared, detailed, perfected; this would increase its merit in the
eyes of the officers and their wonder…..”.

6. – The entrance In Palermo. – In the light of the result obtained, which
was really wonderful, it would seem out of place to examine if on the day of
the 26 th the march on Palermo seemed a wise decision. However, if Garibaldi
felt the need of calling a war council, which was not usual for him, the under-
taking had to seem far from being easy and opportune to him.
In fact, it was risky beyond all description. As long as they had fought in
the open, around Conca d’Oro, it had been easy to escape the enemy when
it appeared in full force; and this because the Mille were good marchers, the
Sicilians knew the place very well and the expeditionary corps had almost no
hindrances. Those very light troops could therefore disengage from the
enemy attack every time they wanted.
But entering in Palermo was the same as facing the enemy in a place where
they had the main body of their army and means: weapons and soldiers,
artilleries and barracks, fleet and fortresses. Palermo could easily become a
huge trap; by entering the city every route of retreat was inexorably closed.