Page 208 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

206 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

Martino”, where Pilo was. Guerzoni saw in it the twofold purpose of “discov-
ering the intentions of the royal troops from close up and reminding them that
he was always thinking to go to Palermo through that way”. Palamenghi, by con-
trast, thought that Garibaldi had wanted to force other troops to leave Palermo.
We do not believe that Garibaldi was shamming. He had set his course
along the most direct way to go to Palermo and he knew that Monreale was
occupied. It was therefore quite natural that he did not advance wildly, but
that he first assessed how many soldiers he had against him. This judgement
was confirmed by Calvino: “Since (Garibaldi) could not attack Monreale gar-
risoned by many troops led by General Bosco and located in a very favourable
position for our enemy, he decided to leave Pioppo and go to Piana dei Greci”.
st
Moreover, if the movement of the 21 had been a mere sham, he would
not have written to Pilo from Partitico on the 18 th asking him for his sup-
port; this would not have been necessary.
And, finally, what kind of result would have obtained the removal of
troops from Palermo? Even if it had taken place, they would have returned
to Palermo before Garibaldi could attack it from another direction.
However, since Monreale was occupied, that was perhaps the most oppor-
tune direction to march on Palermo. And this because Garibaldi could have
received in any moment serious threats from the enemy in front of him but
also from the troops on his flank, from Molara and S, Giuseppe da Parco. He
did well, then, to abandon that direction of march as soon as he recognized
that he could not have reached Palermo from that direction.
In Parco, on the contrary, he had more freedom to manoeuvre, a better
choice between an attack or a mere defence, and an easier retreat towards the
hinterland, a very important thing that had always to be considered. He
stayed there two days. Was this, also, a sham to attract the troops from
Monreale and Palermo, weaken the garrison of that city and take it more eas-
ily by surprise? This idea was also proposed. But it is not sure; Garibaldi said
he had not wanted to do that. We believe that the truth was that Garibaldi
mostly wanted to get time, to achieve the best possible position, to make the
royal troops uncertain about his movements, to tire them out, take them by
surprise and divide them, and, if possible, give them a good reason, to gain
greater prestige among the population by slipping through their fingers if the
outcome of the fight were to become uncertain.

th
th
5. - The Manoeuvres of 25 -26 . – The admirers of the great command-