Page 210 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

208 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

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On the 26 , the choice was therefore laid out as follows: would the pop-
ulation rise in arms? In the negative, could he hope to get his way only with
his 750 soldiers and La Masa’s 3000 almost unarmed men? He wouldn’t even
dream of it. But also in the affirmative, the success was anyway uncertain.
Only the full, total confidence in a general insurrection of the city could jus-
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tify the decision he took on the 26 , which however remained always a sub-
lime act of daring.
Garibaldi played his cards right. First of all, if at Ponte Ammiraglio he had
found stronger outpost with a couple of pieces, he would have had great diffi-
culty entering the city, since the city had not yet risen. And yet, that would
have been the lesser evil, since he could have gone back to Gibilrossa and the
roads to the hinterland would have remained open. But by far greater evil (and
we mentioned it already) would have occurred if, after entering the city, he had
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been surrounded by the troops, as was the case, for other reasons, on the 30 .

7. – The Battle of Milazzo. – This battle was fought by Garibaldi’s soldiers
with great bravery, but to lead it was not easy. Garibaldi said: “ignorance of
the ground on which we were fighting was the main cause of the consider-
able number of our losses, and we could have avoided many of the charges
that we launched against our enemy. My first idea of attack had been to
assault our enemies before daybreak, and to launch a strong mass attack into
their centre to try and divide their forces, separating their left flank, captur-
ing it if possible, and in this way hampering its artillery and cavalry superior-
ity. However, to implement this plan was anything but easy, since our forces
scattered in many positions could not gather in time, and it was in broad day-
light that we started the fight.
“My main objective was to confine the centre and right flank of our ene-
mies in Milazzo, where they could not find supplies to support so many peo-
ple and the local garrison for too long. And therefore I ordered most of our
forces to converge on the centre and the left flank of our enemy…..many vic-
tims and many injured were the outcome of our charges against the cen-
tre…..”. Then Garibaldi decided to move to the left flank of his enemy with
part of his forces, whereas Medici gained time in the centre. “This solution
was key to winning the day”.

8. – The Undertaking of the Mille. – In general, this undertaking was
Garibaldi’s masterpiece, in which he shed light on all his great qualities as