Page 276 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

258 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

tude the orders of H.M….grateful of your the trust in me, in entrusting them
(the volunteers) to my command… in the hope to soon be able to contribute
to the fulfilment of our national destiny with our glorious army”.
And his saying then was “war and harmony!”. A saying that was not always
listened to. Garibaldi had a small part in the planning of the operations and
the organisation of the volunteers because he was advised by the government
to remain in Caprera almost until the end of hostilities to avoid - it was said
– giving rise to premature alarm in the suspicious Austrian diplomacy.
In truth the reason for his precaution is not clear, because since the 6 th of
May the enlisting of volunteers had been publicly called and a few days later
the call to war had been spread through the press.
According to the official Italian report, Garibaldi intended to land near
Trieste, to occupy the city and aimed to travel north on the other side of the
Julian and Carnic Alps to appropriate the passes that from Friuli lead to the
valleys of the Sava and the Drava. Because of political and military consid-
erations, the government did not agree to the proposal, at least for the first
part of the hostilities; and Garibaldi, with a sense of discipline that did him
honour, accepted the task to operate in the Trentino. The objective touched
his good heart. Since 1859, soon after the war, he had sent to the people of
the Trentino a message that for those generous people – people more of deeds
than words – was clear patriotism and bravery. “The name of Bronzetti from
the Trentino region will endure in the memory of future generations as long
as the glorious splendour of our history and will be the war cry of the brave
Hunters of the Alps in future battles against the oppressors of Italy”.
He accepted then the command with enthusiasm, limiting himself to
pointing out the necessity to provide for the defence of lake Garda to be used
as a solid base and have a foothold on the left bank, to facilitate the crossing
of the Mincio by the regular army and ensure the possession of that hilly
region, theatre of great battles. “No one missed the wisdom of this advice –
Chiala writes – but the short time available, the crowd and so many other
known and unknown reasons stopped it from happening”; the dominion of
the lake was therefore left in the hands of the Austrians, against which little
could be done by our meagre and badly armed fleet.
“…A great deal more should have been done – states general Pollio – to
make ready the necessary means for an offensive on that lake, on which we
should have been victorious from the first few days and that should have been
the actual theatre of the main action by Garibaldi…It was on that lake and