Page 277 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

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THE 1866 CAMPAIGN 259

in combined land and water actions that the war genius of our popular
Leader could have shone, the courage and the tactical skills of many old offi-
cers of the great Garibaldi era, and lastly the forceful courage of older and
younger men that shed their blood on that ground on which they could only
advance slowly and with so much hard work”.
Garibaldi also had little direct part in the organisation and the regulation
of the volunteers. The government, for political reasons, delayed their public
call and provision and training were effected, particularly considering the fact
that the government itself had estimated a maximum count of only 15,000
men. It is not clear what this calculation was based on; but almost certainly
they resented the influence of the bias, not totally unjustified and still persist-
ing, of general La Marmora, Prime Minister, regarding the dangers of a pos-
sible rash action on the part of Garibaldi against Rome, and the fear that,
after the attempt in Aspromonte, could give rise to suspicion in the Emperor
Napoleon III, at a moment when the French were about to leave Rome in
accordance with the September Convention. The fact is that since the num-
ber of volunteers in a week rose to double the number expected, it was nec-
essary to add the assembly points of Varese, Gallarate, Bergamo and Barletta
to the two of Como and Bari, and bring the battalions from 20 to 40 with
all the resulting imperfections. The urgency also prevented an accurate selec-
tion of the officers’ cadres, placed in the hands of a mixed commission of
deputies, followers of Garibaldi and army generals. Also the Brigade
Commands and Corps and the positions as officers of General Staff of which
Garibaldi had retained the choice, could not all be given to men that, equal
in terms of personal courage and fiery patriotism, would have the indispen-
sable military practice in terms of command, particularly in the case of a
mountain war. The cream of the generals and higher officers, tested in the
previous campaigns of Garibaldi, had gone over to the regular army and
many of them lacked the practice of managing troops and the authority to
control them.
Guerzoni states: “there was no shortage of good ones and very good ones,
but the avalanche of mediocre, mixed with some very bad ones, suffocated
them”. Maybe this picture is a bit too dark because in some of the corps and
in particular in the two battalions of Bersaglieri there were some very noble
men by birth, heart and intelligence: deputies, cultured, aristocrats, engi-
neers, lawyers, many of which rose to a higher office later on, were only capo-
rals or at most non-commissioned officers. Neither it is correct to say that