Page 75 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version
P. 75

THE 1848 CAMPAIGN                         73



               ability that made him a great leader. He strongly believed that the people
               would follow him. His soul was still contemplating that faraway country
               where he had fought for twelve years to set those people free.  Down there,
               this feeling of independence had become his second religion and all the peo-
               ple fought their national war without respite and to the death. He believed
               that those feelings were alive and strong also in Italy, but they were still dor-
               mant deep in their consciences, people were not yet ready for a great revolu-
               tion.
                  Hence, his feat failed mainly for lack of popular consensus and became no
               more than an attempt, or, better, the early stages of a war of bands, nipped in
               the bud, because Radetzky, frightened by the idea that a handful of ill-armed
               and still worse equipped men could really cause a revolution, rose against
               them with more than an army corps.
                  Limited in space, very short in its duration, this deed had three important
               components: the two fights at Luino and Morazzone and the manoeuvres of
               August 25 around Campo dei Fiori.  The Luino fight was a clash on
               encounter, that of Morazzone a surprise attack; both   were evidence of the
               volunteers’ bravery and the cool nerves of their leader, but no more than that.
               Their tactical importance was not such as to deserve a special memory. They
               lasted one hour or a little more; in Luino the Austrians remained passive, they
               were not able to attack the legionaries when they set out on the road a few at
               a time to line up, they were soon overwhelmed by the attackers’ onslaught,
               fell back and ran. In Morazzone, the Austrian commanders showed lack of
               foresight and incompetence: they ordered the fight to be broken off during
               the night and let Garibaldi’s soldiers escape from a very small village without
               even disturbing their retreat.
                  More worthy of consideration by far is the manoeuvre that Garibaldi
                                                                        th
               operated to escape his encirclement on August 24 th  and 25 . Here, with
               admirable strength, great insight and sharpness, with determination and
               knowledge of the ground, one of his more remarkable military abilities, he
               anticipated the Austrians’ moves and mocked them by attacking them by sur-
               prise and unexpected from behind. A commander with a common mind and
               intelligence, who found himself in that situation, aware that a great army,
               well armed and well-trained, was moving against him, would not risk fight-
               ing on an unknown ground, but would renounce the battle, the outcome of
               which was already compromised, and would reach the Swiss border.
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