Page 36 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

deployed to disturb the enemy troops in the rear. The members of the party were called partigiani
(partisans). Parties were assigned to set traps for the enemies, mislead them, harass their flanks,
intercept their couriers and convoys, disrupt the enemies’ communications, and sabotage their
supplies, compelling them to deploy several troops to protect their logistic infrastructure. They
also conducted propaganda action among the inhabitants of their territories to keep faith and trust
alive, and scare the people living in enemy territories by spreading fake news to create fear and
uncertainty.
These activities, which were included in the so-called ‘small war’ operations, required secrecy,
speed and energy. According to the Rules, a ‘partisan officer’ had to compensate for the lack of a
regular military unit by using astuteness, inventiveness, courage, and readiness of spirit, resorting
to frequent gimmicks.
The 1833 Rules were integrated by the Istruzioni sulle operazioni secondarie della Guerra
(Instructions on Secondary War Operations) of 1855 that emphasised the importance of conducting
exploratory activities, acquiring information about the territory and the enemy, considering how
“often in military history misleading information led to tragic consequences”. The knowledge
achieved by this kind of activities represents “a constant necessity during the war and is of the
utmost importance for the operations which have to be organised on the basis of data gathered
through reconnaissance missions” .
5

The creaTIon of The InTellIgence offIce wIThIn The royal corPs of general sTaff
The year 1855 can be considered as the data of birth of the Intelligence Service in the Sardinian
Army, since the Breve istruzione sul servizio degli Ufficiali del Corpo Reale di Stato Maggiore in
tempo di guerra (Brief Instruction on wartime service for officers belonging to the Royal General
Staff Corps), issued by Minister of War, General Alfonso La Marmora, regulates the officer’s
functions devoted to special missions and secret services .
6
La Marmora’s document also included instructions for spies’ employment in monitoring the enemy
forces as well as the political conditions of foreign provinces. According to the instruction, spies
should be selected with great care and the trustworthiness of their reports had to be cross checked,
since “spies, lured by double salary, could play both sides of the fence and provide fake reports” .
7
It should be noticed that the ‘1855 Instruction’ continued to entrust the General Staff Corps
with executive instead of managerial tasks and did not really establish an intelligence body with
specialised personnel who, also in peacetime, should deal exclusively with this complex service.
This deficiency was partially overcome, soon thereafter, by the setup of the ‘Military Office of the
Royal General Staff Corps’, with the task of gathering ‘at any time’ intelligence about the defence
forces of Italy’s neighbouring powers and writing monographs on topography and statistics about
these countries with a military view .
8
During war operations, the Military Office was expected to provide the Headquarters with an
‘Intelligence Office’ capable to deliver detailed information about the enemy. Already through

5 Filippo Stefani, La storia della dottrina e degli ordinamenti dell’Esercito Italiano, volume I Dall’Esercito Piemontese
all’Esercito di Vittorio Veneto, AUSSME, Rome, 1984, pp. 99-100.
6 The document is dated April 1855, coinciding with the departure of the Piedmontese expedition to Crimea.
7 Spies should be interrogated in complete isolation. Then, they had to answer specific questions about, for example, the
location of the enemy’s Headquarters, stock of vehicles, lines of battle, reserves, storehouses, and hospitals as well as about
the size of the military forces and the names of the main commanders.
8 This work should be carried out by four Sections which also had intelligence capabilities in common. (AUSSME, L-3
Series, env.301).

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