Page 152 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

152 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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The USSR replaced all the military equipment lost by the Arabs in the Six-Day
War with more up to date and better quality material – tanks, artillery, war ships,
planes and most important of all an anti-aircraft missile system, that could close
the skies against attacking aircraft. Russian advisors were sent to Egypt and Syria
and trained the troops in the use of all the new weapons and both armies undertook
intensive training in order to operate their new weapons.
The Suez Canal was the dividing line between the Israeli and Egyptian forces.
The Egyptians started to open artillery fire and employed commandos to cross the
Canal, and to set up ambushes against the Israeli troops. On the eastern front, the
Jordan River was the dividing line between Jordan and Israel, and from here Pales-
tinian groups repeatedly crossed into Israel causing losses both in lives and property.
In addition, there were many clashes on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. This
situation lasted from the end of the Six-Day War in 1967 until half way through 1970
causing heavy casualties in Israel, both military and civilian.
Israel reacted to these attacks with the use of artillery and tanks, and also by op-
erating deep inside enemy territory with the aid of elite commando forces flown in
by helicopters, but refrained from involving the full force of the IAF in order not to
cause any escalation in the conflict.
During this period, the IAF purchased from the U.S.A. Skyhawk (1968) and Phan-
tom (1969) aircrafts, as well as helicopters and high quality transport planes. New
bases were built and new squadrons formed while and the aircrews and ground crews
very quickly fully absorbed the new aircrafts into the day to day running of the air
force.
The situation on the borders continued to deteriorate until finally Israel was left
with no choice other than to operate the air force in full strength. The Egyptians had
concentrated some 1000 pieces of artillery, thousands of tanks and hundreds of thou-
sands of troops on the Canal. The Israeli Army could not compete with this either in
manpower nor equipment. The IAF made up for this inequality in numbers and was
a suitable response to the firepower of the Egyptians against the Israeli Army.
The first operations of the IAF on the Egyptian border were in 20th July 1969
(“Boxer operation”) with heavy attacks on Egyptian artillery, camps and positions
on the canal and above all the missile system that the Egyptians had positioned on
the border.
This war, which was called the “War of Attrition”, was a static war with both
sides trying to inflict maximum loss and damage to the other side without the ability
to capture territory. The IAF was termed in this war “The flying artillery of the IDF”
as it took on the brunt of the war – without minimizing the many actions taken by the
other forces such as the artillery, navy commandos and special forces behind enemy
lines. The effect of these attacks by the IAF was decisive and proved the ineffective-
ness of the Egyptian army.
Even before the IAF was used along the canal, it instigated air battles with the