Page 155 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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tHe military doCtrine of tHe israeli air forCe

the war. However, in the first three days of the war, despite more losses, the IAF
succeeded in aiding the ground forces preventing further advances of the enemy, es-
pecially on the Golan Heights, until the reserve forces could be called up and arrive
at the front lines.
With the arrived of the reserves, the ground forces went on the offensive with
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massive air support. In the next four days, from the 9 to the 12 October, the Syr-
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ians were pushed back not only to the original borders before the war, but the IDF
advanced to within 35 kms of Damascus.
On the Egyptian front, the enemy had managed to establish a bridgehead to a
depth of 8-10 kms from the Canal. The fighting was mostly static at this stage, but
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on the 12 October, the Egyptians tried to advance with tanks and infantry on a large
scale. Once again the IAF together with the armour units played a major part in re-
pulsing this attack, forcing the Egyptians back to their original positions.
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The change came on the 16 October, when the IDF succeeded in forcing a cross-
ing of the Suez Canal between the two Egyptian armies and set up a bridgehead
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which was quickly expanded both to the north and the south. By the 22 October, the
Egyptian Third Army in the south was completely cut off from any support or sup-
plies and its situation became critical. A cease-fire was agreed on both fronts shortly
afterwards (on 24th October).
In this war, the IAF was forced to wage war differently to what had been planned,
and to fight in areas protected by ground to air missiles. Despite losses, the IAF was
able to intercept enemy aircraft trying to attack ground troops, to engage them in the
air and to destroy in all more than 350 Egyptian and Syrian aircrafts in air-to-air bat-
tles. 50 more aircrafts were hit by anti-aircraft fire, and about 30 were destroyed in
their own air-bases. At the last phase of the war the IAF attacked the Egyptian mis-
siles and destroyed some 40 sites and 10 more were destroyed by the ground forces.
By the end of the war the skies over Egypt were once again open to the IAF with no
missile protection. 10 Airfields in Egypt and 8 in Syria were also attacked, forcing
the air forces of the enemy to waste its attacking potential through having to be in
the air to protect its own bases. In Syria, targets attacked included bases, command
posts, fuel dumps, ports and other vital strategic targets in the country.
The IAF also participated in the transport of supplies and materials to the front
line forces, and the evacuation of hundreds of injured to medical centers in the center
of the country.
In the Yom Kippur War the IAF lost 102 aircrafts, fifty per cent of which were hit
by ground-to-air missiles and 40 more by anti-air fire.
The war ended with cease-fire agreements at a stage where Israeli forces were
within artillery range of the Syrian capital Damascus, and within 100 km from the
Egyptian capital Cairo, with an Egyptian army of 35,000 men surrounded with no
water, and with no possibility of fresh supplies.