Page 167 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

Israele

*
daVid iVry
The Air Arm during the Lebanon War 1982

Background

As a preface to direct reference to the use of air power in 1982, one should un-
derstand several transformations that the Israel Air Force experienced in the field
of air warfare, organization and weapons, in order to better analyze the war and its
results. The destruction of air forces on the ground within a few hours during the
Six Day War (1967), and the air combat achievements, were both an unprecedented
achievement, which also has mixed results because it led to great expectations from
the Israel Air Force.
On the other hand, the defeated air forces learned many lessons and implemented
them, so it was impossible to repeat the results. Shielded shelters were built for
aircraft that exceeded their number, additional runways were built and many emer-
gency runways were prepared. All this was part of passive defense.
The anti-a/c defense got a huge leverage, guns but mainly missile. The surface-
to-air missile (SAM) was a leap forward when the Soviet doctrine of operating a
strenuous independent arm, the divisions of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 batteries were the
massive foundation of the doctrine, and thousands of SA-7 missiles were available
in almost any unit or military facility.
During the War of Attrition (1968-1970), this concept was leveraged and the Israel
Air Force found itself in August 1970 with a cease fire treaty, when the Egyptian
army had advanced its surface-to-air missiles right up to the canal, contrary to the
agreement, but Israel had to restrain itself because it did not have a decisive answer
to surface-to-air missiles. As part of the means that the IAF had, it developed attack
methods and war doctrine, including the use of air power in the presence of surface-
to-air missiles. EW methods were also acquired from the U.S., means that were
developed during the Vietnam War.
We arrived at the Yom Kippur War in 1973, after improving the attack tactics and
EW capability; however, we did not succeed in pushing forward the development of
weapons to destroy surface-to-air missiles, thus losing the air freedom of action we
were used to, and which the IDF ground forces were used to.
In the operation plans prior to the Yom Kippur War, the IAF demanded 48 hours
to launch air power against surface-to-air missiles sites and air bases, thus assur-
ing air superiority to continue fighting. The IDF staff level was sympathetic to this;
however reality in the 1973 war did not enable such luxury. The IAF was required

* M.Gen., former Chief of the IDF Air Force.