Page 169 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

the AIr Arm durIng the lebAnon wAr 1982 169

command and a lot of investment. In many times, this caused many doubts as to the
effectiveness of offensive air power against such defense, when the results of the
Vietnam war and Yom Kippur war left a bad taste with the air power.
Preparation for the operation itself and the possibility of confronting once again
the surface-to-air missile defense was the role of many people, mostly air force, but
also many of the R&D and defense industries.
For 9 years since the end of the Yom Kippur war, the IAF was busy developing an
anti surface-to-air missile system. The lessons of the Yom Kippur war, as written in
a document dated 30 January 1974, summarizes briefly the lessons and briefings of
the war in all IAF units. The document had been approved by IAF Commander MG
Benjamin Peled, includes in chapter 4 – weapon systems – the main requirements
and efforts to implement an answer to the surface-to-air missile threat. It mentioned
“surface-to-air missile operation system”, with an emphasis on “system” rather than
a specific weapon. The Yom Kippur war lessons showed that one should refer to
the operation of air power in modern war through the operation of combat systems
that include all the elements of intelligence, command and control, communication,
training and weapon systems. In other words, accurate, sophisticated, modern weap-
ons, with new technology is not sufficient, if you cannot get the control and backing
of other systems working in harmony towards success.
The IAF, with the assistance of defense industries, succeeded in making progress
along the 9 years, and built many elements that gave it the opportunity to design
various attack systems against surface-to-air missiles. A combination of elements
created a combat system suitable for different arenas and different conditions. The
surface-to-air missile arena in Lebanon was, therefore, one variant but the Lebanon
option was the focus in training and simulations, including real models without re-
leasing ammunition in the Lebanon scenario itself.
In IDF status assessments that took place prior to June 1982 and dealt with various
operative planning that included penetrating Lebanon in order to banish the terror-
ists from southern Lebanon, there was always the dilemma of surface-to-air missile.
Since these were part of the Syrian military forces, it meant entering a confrontation
with the Syrians, not only the terrorists. This is why alternatives and timing were
explored in combat that requires the attack on surface-to-air missiles On the other
hand, as long as Syrian surface-to-air missiles operate, the limitations of operating
the Israel Air Force were being examined.
The fundamental question was, of course, whether an attack on the surface-to-air
missiles in the Beka’a would deteriorate to a major war with Syria. Since the politi-
cal direction was usually to avoid war with Syria, especially during the Lebanon war,
the question was laid at full force on the desk of the defense establishment each day
since the war started.
During the first days of the Lebanon war, my instructions were to avoid any air
penetration into Syria, and even stop pursuing Syrian jets if it risked crossing the