Page 237 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

doCtrine, CapaCities, teCHnology and operational environment on tHe employment of tHe air power; tHe Case of guerrilla warfare 237

Command with Negage, Maquela, Cabinda and Toto, as well as an Aeronautical HF
mobile service linking the stations above with some aircraft that had this type of re-
ceivers. Air control towers operating in the VHF band were built in the airfields. All
airplanes, with the exception of the F84, the NORD and C54, were equipped with
VHF/FM for contact with the ground forces. The only radio aids to navigation were
radio beacons installed at the main bases. A relatively obsolete radar was installed
in Negage.
The operations for the recovery of the strongholds occupied by rebel forces were
given as concluded by late September 1961, when the situation was considered sta-
ble with no outbreaks of lawless violence uncovered. This meant that the war would
go on to have another feature, more in accor dance with the classic guerrilla war
paradigm.
With the completion of major operations, started in April 1961, the military had
been gradually gaining control of the situation: the villages and farms were being
occupied by military force, and security was being established. It was a very difficult
situation, in particular because of the nature of anarchic violence. With more secu-
rity, the populations were returning progressively to their homes, economic activity
was returning to normal, the roads which had been cut with “abatizes” (huge tree
trunks) and mines were being cleaned and brid ges that had been destroyed were be-
ing rebuilt, the first being the so-called coffee road in the hills of Canda, in July. A
ground forces grid was being set up, with a lot of small units in all relevant posi tions.
Between February and late June 1961 the ground forces casualties amounted to 50
killed and over a hundred serious injuries.
Air activity continued in this period at that pace, not only in participation in these
operations but also in actions of presence and logistical support to military person-
nel and civilians in other areas of Angola. Outside the areas where there was still no
presence of Portuguese troops, the Air Force acted independently, with no need in
coordinating its actions within the strategy defined by the high ranks, either through
reconnaissance and patrol or by offensive actions when the objectives were consid-
ered important.
The declaration of stability towards the end of September 1961 did not obviously
mean the end of military operations. The political system called the operations from
that moment on, as police operations, for reasons of international political strategy,
but in reality they were war operations in the form of guerrilla warfare. As noted,
only the Northern Province was hit by this wave of violence that was directed from
the Congo.
The fundamental difference in the military situation was in the form of action of
the rebel forces: the first phase, between March and September, was characterized
by massacres of civilians, with knives, machetes and “canhangulos” and the rebel
forces moved in open terrain against the populations and military forces, in large
fanaticized masses. It was relatively easy to detect the movements of these hordes